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This paper aims to revisit and reinforce the early development of Farmers Fox Theory (Reddy et al., 2014a)
by analysing three cases in the cross-border inbound acquisitions stream. A qualitative case method is
adopted to explore the ﬁndings from the sample cases, which are the VodafoneeHutchison telecom deal,
the Bharti AirteleMTN broken telecom deal, and the VedantaeCairn India oil deal. We highlight dis-
cussions on organizational factors, due diligence issues, deal characteristics, and country-speciﬁc de-
terminants. Importantly, we test various theories propounded in the economics and management
literature, and establish an interdisciplinary setting to both redeﬁne the theory and reframe the prop-
ositions. The study eventually suggests that government ofﬁcials' erratic nature and the ruling political
party's inﬂuence were found to be severe in foreign inward deals characterized by a higher bid value, a
listed target company, cash payments, and stronger government control in the industry. The ﬁndings of
this research not only help researchers in strategy and international business but also managers
participating in cross-border negotiations.
Copyright © 2015, Far Eastern Federal University, Kangnam University, Dalian University of Technology,
Kokushikan University. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC
BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
1.1. Theoretical underpinnings
From the lens of development economics theory, international
organizations and economic researchers have classiﬁed the given
economic condition into the two groups of developed and devel-
oping countries. While supporting this streak, scholars from soci-
ology, political, and legal studies have improved the deﬁnition of
the economy on the basis of regulatory governance and political
institutions. The two approaches suggest that developedIndia; FDI, foreign direct in-
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C-ND license (http://creativecommeconomies have better quality laws, regulations, and institutions,
which results in rich economic performance. In contrast, devel-
oping economies are characterized by poor economic results, lower
quality institutions, no signiﬁcant expertise in public administra-
tion, highly corrupt government ofﬁcials, erratic behaviour of in-
stitutions, and high political intervention. In this vein, Lucas (1990)
postulated ‘why capital does not ﬂow from rich to poor countries’
and suggested that theweak institutional environment is one of the
important determinants of insufﬁcient capital ﬂows from rich to
poor nations. We propose that this postulation represents an
institutional dichotomous characteristic of a developing economy,
which scholars coined the ‘Lucas paradox’ (Alfaro et al., 2008).
Theoretically, a given country has two investment options to doing
business in other countries, namely direct international investment
and portfolio investment. The direct investment allows the investor
to enter a foreign country through a greenﬁeld investment and/or
mergers and acquisitions. Alternative entry mode choices include
exporting, franchising, and licensing, among others.
Through the 1985e1991 economic and institutional policy re-
forms, developing countries have improved their economic in-
dicators, regulatory laws, and business culture, thereby attracting
signiﬁcant overseas investments in various industries. In otherUniversity of Technology, Kokushikan University. Production and hosting by Elsevier
ons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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from developed to developing economies through overseas in-
vestment reforms. For instance, the beneﬁts are seen in business
models, education, management expertise, technology, culture,
living standards, and so forth. Following the globalization and
liberalization programmes, the distance between countries has
shortened, markets have integrated, and communication costs have
declined sharply, together leading to the closer integration of so-
cieties (Stiglitz, 2004). At the same time, multinational corporations
(MNCs) from developed economies have increased their in-
vestments in developing countries through the preferred method
of foreign market entry of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) [in
addition to greenﬁeld investments]. This method offers numerous
beneﬁts, ranging from ownership to location advantages, and at-
tracts signiﬁcant risks, especially economic, regulatory, and politi-
cal shocks (Bris and Cabolis, 2008; Kiymaz, 2009; Meschi and
Metais, 2006; Rossi and Volpin, 2004). For instance, the extant
M&A research reported that 83% of deals failed to create share-
holder value and 53% actually destroyed value (as cited in Marks
and Mirvis, 2011:162). For international deals, the failure rate
ranges from 45% to 67% (Mukherji et al., 2013). Yet, the world
market for corporate control activities substantially improved
during 1991e2012, particularly from the sixth merger wave start-
ing in 2003 (Feito-Ruiz andMenendez-Requejo, 2011). For example,
the worldwide number of cross-border deals (deal value) increased
at a massive growth rate of 241% (1360%), from 1582 (US$21.09
billion) in 1991 to 5400 (US$308.06 billion) in 2012. For the Asian
market, sales in terms of number of deals (deal value) notably
improved at a signiﬁcant growth rate of 908% (1818%), from 79
(US$1.54 billion) in 1991 to 796 (US$29.48 billion) in 2012.
Conversely, purchases in terms of number of deals (deal value)
drastically increased at a considerable growth rate of 833% (3521%),
from 82 (US$2.20 billion) in 1991 to 765 (US$79.78 billion) in 2012.
However, the percentage of the value of cross-border deals arising
from foreign direct investment (FDI) inﬂows for 1991e2012 grew at
an average annual rate of 37% for worldwide countries and 13% for
the Asian market (UNCTAD, 2013).
Herewith, we postulate that cross-border inward investments
declined at a shocking rate for both the Asian and the Indian
market, whereas outward investments massively increased given
lower asset valuations in developed markets and to escape from
home country institutional barriers (Reddy et al., 2014b; Witt and
Lewin, 2007). In addition to mounting overseas acquisitions in
emerging markets, we notice that inbound and outbound deals are
often litigated or are induced by institutional shocks in the host
country when they are characterized by higher valuation, cash
payments, and strong government control over the industry. For
instance, Zhang et al. (2011:226) reported that 68.7% of worldwide
acquisition attempts were completed during 1982e2009, of which
210,183 deals were not completed (460,710 deals completed) out of
670,893 acquisition events. Thus, this paper intends to analyse
those litigated inbound deals associated with the Asian emerging
market of India.
Extant international business (IB) and ﬁnance studies found that
a country's constitutional framework, political and legal environ-
ment, bilateral trade relations, and culture play an important role in
cross-border trade and investment deals for both ex-ante and ex-
post performance. For example, Alguacil et al. (2011),
Barbopoulos et al. (2012), Bris and Cabolis (2008), Erel et al.
(2012), Francis et al. (2008), di Giovanni (2005), Huizinga and
Voget (2009), Hur et al. (2011), and Rossi and Volpin (2004) sug-
gested that legal infrastructure, corporate governance practices,
ﬁnancial markets development, the level of investor protection, the
quality of accounting and reporting standards, and socio-cultural
factors are the key determinants that affect the completion ofcross-borderM&A. Further, macroeconomic factors, including gross
domestic product, the tax system and tax incentives, the exchange
rate, and the inﬂation rate, have a signiﬁcant impact on overseas
acquisitions (Blonigen, 1997; Hebous et al., 2011; Pablo, 2009;
Scholes and Wolfson, 1990; Uddin and Boateng, 2011). Moskalev
(2010) found that a number of overseas investment projects
signiﬁcantly improved with respect to the progress made by a host
country's legal enforcement of foreign investors. Importantly, local
political events including general elections affect both inbound and
outbound FDI ﬂows (Ezeoha and Ogamba, 2010; Sch€ollhammer and
Nigh, 1984, 1986), and physical distance affects foreign investments
(Rose, 2000). Overall, value-creating strategies, such as mergers,
acquisitions, and strategic joint ventures, promote corporate
governance and institutional development (Alba et al., 2009;
Martynova and Renneboog, 2008b).
With these prior studies in mind, we examine cross-border in-
bound acquisitions to the emerging country of India through a
legitimate method of qualitative research, that is, case study
research. Thus, we engage in a deep investigation into why cross-
border inbound deals in India are frequently litigated. Before we
explain the research framework, we present the factors that
determine the success of cross-border M&As. Existing literature on
cross-border M&A transactions suggests that ﬁrm-speciﬁc, deal-
speciﬁc, and country-speciﬁc determinants inﬂuence both the
negotiation process and post-merger integration. Then, we conduct
the research and draw conclusions for the following broad research
inquiry: how do host country characteristics affect the completion
of international acquisition? Altogether, we attempt to revisit and
reinforce the Farmers Fox Theory through an in-depth analysis
(test) of three cases of cross-border inbound deals. Prior develop-
ment of this theory was primarily propounded on the basis of ev-
idence from a single case and inadequate testing of the theory
(Reddy et al., 2014a).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The balance
of Section 1 presents the research motivation, the research ques-
tion, objectives, and scope and contribution. Section 2 describes the
research design with a special emphasis on the multiple case study
method. Section 3 discusses key insights drawn from the cross-case
analysis. Section 4 describes testing the theory and the case proofs.
Section 5 outlines the major research task, which is to revisit and
reinforce the Farmers Fox Theory. Section 6 concludes this study.
1.2. Research motivation
A signiﬁcant number of previous studies examined cross-border
acquisitions through the lens of ﬁnance, economics, and strategic
management, whereas a small number of studies investigatedM&A
in the IB ﬁeld. By and large, academic and industry researchers
analysed stock returns around the announcement, post-merger
operating performance, and integration determinants. These
studies inferred that on-going scholars have signiﬁcant scope for
studying pre-merger negotiations, determinants of deal comple-
tion, and the inﬂuence of host country institutional attributes.
Indeed, seven tracks that appeared in the cross-border M&A stream
motivated us to pursue this research. At the outset, foreign market
entry choices are an important research focus in the IB and strategy
ﬁelds (Chapman, 2003; Hopkins, 1999). First, cross-border M&A
largely remains underexplored compared with domestic M&A, and
more theoretical and empirical research is needed to improve the
current state of the literature (Bertrand and Betschinger, 2012; Hur
et al., 2011; Shimizu et al., 2004). Second, inadequate research ex-
ists on deal completion that enables the study of factors affecting
the success of cross-border inbound acquisitions (Ahammad and
Glaister, 2013; Reis et al., 2013; Zhang et al., 2011). Third, most of
the existing literature was built on the developed economies
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Zuniga, 2006), which may be used to investigate deals in emerging
economies to both support the existing theory and add new streaks
to the literature (Barbopoulos et al., 2014; Bertrand and
Betschinger, 2012; Francis et al., 2014; Kim, 2009; Malhotra et al.,
2011; Zhu, 2011). Fourth, the M&A stream is one of the promi-
nent research areas that attracts scholars from various disciplines,
including economics, strategy, ﬁnance, accounting, sociology, law,
and politics. However, the ﬁeld needs to be deeply analysed
through the creation of an ‘interdisciplinary’ environment and not
by engaging in ‘multidisciplinary research’ (Bengtsson and Larsson,
2012; Cantwell and Brannen, 2011). Fifth, a vast quantity of M&A
research is empirically driven and ignores qualitative research ap-
proaches. For example, Haleblian et al. (2009) reviewed the M&A
research published between 1992 and 2007 and found that only 3%
out of 167 research publication articles used the case studymethod.
Thus, we adopted the qualitative case study method in this
research. Sixth, most of the existing theories were developed on the
basis of advanced countries' behaviour; however, these theories
should also be tested in emergingmarkets environments and a new
theory should be developed in the given setting (Hoskisson et al.,
2000).
Finally yet importantly, recent studies focused on and analysed
how institutional distance, economic nationalism, and political
behaviour affect the completion of cross-border acquisitions
(Geppert et al., 2013; Lin et al., 2009; Serdar Dinc and Erel, 2013;
Wan and Wong, 2009; Zhang and He, 2014; Zhang et al., 2011). In
a recent survey paper, Ferreira et al. (2014) showed bibliometric
results for the extant strategy and IB studies on M&A research
during the 1980e2010 period. They mentioned that ‘institutional
theory has been remarkably absent from M&A research …, and
suggested that emerging markets institutional authorities’ behav-
iour and government intervention in overseas acquisitions' could
be most relevant for further research. In addition, an analysis of
deals with India is important for several reasons (Lebedev et al.,
2015; Mukherji et al., 2013; Peng et al., 2008; Reddy et al., 2013,
2015). For example, emerging markets provide a unique setting
(Bruton et al., 2008) in which to test existing theories because they
characterize growing markets, improving economic performance,
cheap labour, and some extent of liberalized regulations and
governance standards [high levels of politicking, social crime, cor-
ruption, the erratic nature of government ofﬁcials, and other
foreignness issues]. In short, they behave differently from devel-
oped markets in many aspects, such as culture, technology, quality
of law, income, living standards, and status of the economy (Stiglitz,
2004). Importantly, we ﬁnd an emergent research interest in
emerging countries such as China and India. For instance, a recent
article by Xu and Meyer (2013) found that a total of 161 emerging
economy-related papers were published during 2006e2010
compared with 99 in 2001e2005 (63% overall increase). Their re-
sults infer that stylish theoretical and empirical research is required
on Indian businesses, which could shed light on strategies of
emerging market ﬁrms, including outbound acquisitions, interna-
tionalization, and direct international investmentse to name a few.
In sum, this study aims to achieve research goals that likely
recognize high-impact research in management studies (Alvesson
and Sandberg, 2013).
1.3. Research synthesis
Qualitative case study investigations in the M&A stream are
scanty, and the subject is largely dominated by quantitative
research. At the same time, the analysis of cases between different
borders requires adequate time and expertise, which depend on
researcher quality. In this study, we adopted multi-case research toboth test existing theories responsible for the M&A stream and to
build a new theory from the emerging markets phenomenon.
Nevertheless, a few studies examined international acquisitions
involving emerging market enterprises, but they largely used
empirical research tools (Agbloyor et al., 2013; Al Rahahleh and
Wei, 2012; Chen et al., 2009; Francis et al., 2014; Malhotra et al.,
2011). Conversely, a small number of studies analysed interna-
tional acquisition cases (primary/secondary data) in both devel-
oped and emerging markets (Geppert et al., 2013; Halsall, 2008;
Meyer and Altenborg, 2007, 2008; Wan and Wong, 2009). Impor-
tantly, a signiﬁcant knowledge gap exists in theM&A stream, which
gives scholars the opportunity to investigate international acqui-
sition processes and completions, especially when ﬁrms from
developed markets seek to acquire ﬁrms in developing countries
(Bertrand and Betschinger, 2012; Epstein, 2005; Reis et al., 2013;
Serdar Dinc and Erel, 2013; Zhang et al., 2011). Therefore, the
Asian emerging market of India has been chosen as a sophisticated
research setting for many reasons. Using archival data, we devel-
oped three cases in cross-border inbound acquisitions representing
India and, thereby, designed a conjectural framework for a cross-
case analysis. The cases selected for research meet the criteria of
case study research. For instance, the cases should answer either
why/how or both (Yin, 2003).1.4. Research question
The objective of research should be a multi-level, multi-disci-
pline ‘uniﬁed’ theory (Buckley and Lessard, 2005:595). Indeed,
matching the methodology to the research question is central to
any research effort (as cited in Nicholson and Kiel, 2007). Qualita-
tive researchers suggested that the formulation of a research
question is the most crucial phase in studies employing case study
research (Tsang, 2013; Yin, 2003). While supporting this streak, we
also postulate that a given research question should be accompa-
nied by research arguments that are unexplored in the literature. In
contrast, ﬁnding a research gap or formulating a research question
in the M&A subject is not easy given the massive size and extensive
coverage of the literature since it was unveiled in the 19th century
(Martynova and Renneboog, 2008a). Albeit, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant
knowledge gaps when scholars started drawing attention to
emerging markets behaviour, and such attention has increased
appreciably after the special issue publication of the Academy of
Management Journal (Hoskisson et al., 2000). In particular, two
special issue sequels suggested that scholars from developed and
emerging markets are keen to examine different strategies that
affect ﬁrm performance through the lens of different theories,
namely the resource-based view, transaction cost economics, the
eclectic paradigm, and institutional theory (Wright et al., 2005; Xu
and Meyer, 2013). Importantly, recent studies examined institu-
tional distance, political intervention, and nationalism in cross-
border M&A transactions (Ferreira et al., 2014; Meyer et al., 2009;
Reis et al., 2013), and this research trend/focus is expected to
improve and attract other emerging markets scholars. For instance,
Meyer et al. (2009) noted that institutional differences inﬂuence
‘how foreign ﬁrms adapt entry strategies when entering emerging
countries’. Similarly, Serdar Dinc and Erel (2013) raised a research
query: ‘do governments really resist the acquisition of domestic
companies by foreign companies?’ Xu and Meyer (2013) also dis-
cussed institutional aspects and linked theory to the emerging
markets context. In sum, we approach emerging markets through
research on a qualitative case study that develops better sponsor-
ship in formulating the following research question.
How (does) the host country institutional framework inﬂuence
the completion of a cross-border inbound acquisition that
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for completion’?
in turn,
How (does) a national weak regulatory and legal framework
affect overseas inbound acquisitions, both referring to ‘acquirer/
target and the host country's sovereign income’?
Taking things forward, the study posits
Do we need a new theory to explain the statutory behaviour of
emerging economies around inbound investments/acquisitions
and the impact on their sovereign revenue?
1.5. Research objectives
The focal objective of this multi-case study research is to ‘build
new theory’. To accomplish this goal, we set the following sec-
ondary or prerequisite tasks on the basis of the extant literature
that addresses cross-border M&A, the phenomenon related to
emerging market India, and the cases chosen for research:
A To examine the host country's institutional laws that uncover
an international taxation plea in a completed cross-border
inbound acquisition;
A To investigate the impact of ﬁnancial markets regulations
and provisions on border-crossing inbound deals that result
in delays, and then are completed or are unsuccessful;
A To study the adverse behaviour of public administration and
political intervention in overseas inbound deals that became
delayed, and then are completed or are unsuccessful; and
A To test existing theories propounded in various disciplines
while supporting adequate case(s) evidence.
In addition to reinforcing the theory, we also suggest testable
propositions for initiating further research on cross-border M&A in
other emerging market settings.
1.6. Research scope and contribution
It is worth stating that the M&A ﬁeld is an interdisciplinary
event, which allows a scholar to study a particular knowledge gap
with an in-depth focus that enriches the literature by focussing on
different disciplines. The scope of the research is prone to be broad
and engages in an analysis from the lens of different disciplines e
economics, corporate ﬁnance, strategic management, organization
studies, sociology, law, and, importantly, IB. For example, we test
novel theories propounded in various disciplines, such as the
resource-based view theory, liability of foreignness, information
asymmetry theory, market efﬁciency theory, institutional theory,
organizational learning theory, and so forth. Because of the wide-
spread theoretical backdrop, the research contribution is signiﬁcant
and vital to the current state of knowledge. Thus, we examine the
impact of the host country's institutional environment (e.g. ﬁnan-
cial markets, and taxation, and political involvement) on cross-
border inbound acquisitions for various reasons: deals charac-
terize higher valuations and cash payments, the acquirer belongs to
a developed country, and the industry is largely controlled by
public sector enterprises. We also postulate how a weak regulatory
system adversely affects a given host country's sovereign revenue
whilst promising beneﬁts to the acquirer and/or target ﬁrm in
overseas inbound deals.
This unique effort entails using qualitative case research to
analyse the impact of institutional determinants on cross-borderinbound acquisitions when hosted by the emerging market of In-
dia. Nevertheless, this study is among the few to examine Indian
M&A deals (domestic/overseas) through case study research
because it tests existing theory and builds new theory. Further, this
study is exceptional in the extensive M&A literature because of its
interdisciplinary setting and its theory building through the new
multi-case research procedure. Therefore, the contribution of this
research is fourfold. First, we consider the emerging market
behaviour of India as a potential research setting to study the
impact of institutional and legal environments on cross-border
deals. Second, a multi-case investigation enhances the current
knowledge on pre-merger negotiations (deal completion) when
transactions occur between developed and developing countries,
and addresses higher valuations, cash payments, and more gov-
ernment control in the industry. Third, we discover a new method
of multi-case research design to both overcome research obstacles
(e.g. data collection) and study the emerging markets phenome-
non. Lastly, we propose a new theory and suggest propositions for
enhancing the current knowledge and initiating further research on
the ‘impact of institutional distance and political intervention in
cross-border deals’, which in turn should explain the ‘host or home
country economic beneﬁts’. In addition, the ﬁndings of the research
have strategic implications for multinational managers, economic
policy, the legal framework, and society.
2. Research design: multiple case study method
Unlike empirical studies, qualitative research has had a mark-
edly different methodological rhythm for various reasons,
including rigour and quality. Indeed, qualitative researchers review
the exhaustive literature in the given ﬁeld to strengthen their
research arguments. Qualitative research is a form of scientiﬁc in-
quiry that aims to understand ‘complex social processes … and
characterizes organizational processes, dynamics, and describes
social interactions and elicits individual attitudes and preferences’
(Curry et al., 2009:1442e1443). Qualitative research is helpful in
business research when analysing critical issues that remain un-
clear in quantitative research (Eriksson and Kovalainen, 2008).
However, qualitative research has been underutilized in the man-
agement discipline. For instance, regrettably, IB is still depicted as
‘empirically driven, a theoretical ﬁeld that fails to go much beyond
the descriptive’ (Shenkar, 2004:165).
Therefore, we chose qualitative case study research to achieve
our research goals. Case study research (CSR) aims to investigate
and analyse the unique nature of an organizational environment in
a real-life setting on the basis of single or multiple cases that are
carefully bounded by time and place (Conrad and Serlin, 2006;
Miles and Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1995; Yin, 1994, 2003). When
commenting on sampling, Yin (1994) suggested that case re-
searchers might use a single case or multiple cases that depend on
the purpose of the research e whether testing or developing the-
ory. The problem with single cases is the limitations in generaliz-
ability and several information-processing biases (Eisenhardt,
1989). Importantly, case studies provide rich and in-depth evi-
dence with which to develop theories and offer theoretical con-
structs and testable propositions in an emergent research area.
Subsequent studies advanced Eisenhardt's concept (Bengtsson and
Larsson, 2012; Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007; Hoon, 2013).
Whereas theory building from multiple cases typically yields the-
ories that are more robust, generalizable, and testable than the
single-case research… ‘theory-building research using cases typi-
cally answers questions addressing “how” and “why” in unexplored
research areas’ (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). The case study
method has become an increasingly popular and relevant research
strategy in business management studies (Hoon, 2013). In sum, the
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approach that allows a researcher to deeply study and ‘look up’
critical and complicated business transactions e unsuccessful M&A
deals. For example, Fang et al. (2004) and Meyer and Altenborg
(2007, 2008) analysed the failed merger between two Scandina-
vian telecom companies: Telia of Sweden and Telenor of Norway.
Wan andWong (2009) analysed an unsuccessful takeover of Unocal
(United States) by CNOOC's (China). Conversely, a few studies
examined multiple cases using various theoretical frameworks
(Geppert et al., 2013; Liu and Zhang, 2014; Riad and Vaara, 2011).
At the outset, extant social sciences and theoretical manage-
ment concepts and empirical literature have been largely deter-
mined on the basis of western (developed) economies' institutional
context. In the recent past, many researchers argued that western
theories are inadequate for studying the emerging markets phe-
nomenon and described the problems related to data collection,
data analysis, and theory development. We also (experience) ﬁnd
thatmajor problems exist in emergingmarkets (e.g. India, Pakistan)
that are accountable for data collection, especially primary data
(interview/survey) (Dieleman and Sachs, 2008; Dhanaraj and
Khanna, 2011; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Malik and Kotabe, 2009;
Reddy and Agrawal, 2012). The quality of either qualitative
research or quantitative research depends on the rigour (or
approachability) of the research carried out by the researcher in a
given setting (Yin, 1994, 2003).
In sum, qualitative case researchers argued that sample cases or
units of analysis should offer a sophisticated research setting to test
extant theory and to improve/build the theory. Indeed, a multi-case
research design provides a signiﬁcant theoretical backdrop relative
to the single case environment. We adopted the multi-case
research method and developed ‘special’ tasks to build new the-
ory and enhance the knowledge of the M&A ﬁeld.
2.1. Sample cases
The focal research question in this study is: does a host country's
weak regulatory system beneﬁt both the acquirer and the target
ﬁrm in cross-border (inbound) acquisitions? To enhance this
question, we derive two equated sub-research questions, i.e. why
and how (Yin, 2003). In the current setting, why were cross-border
inbound acquisition deals delayed or called off? How does a host
country's regulatory system affect the acquirer and the target ﬁrms
involved in cross-border inbound transactions? To examine these
research questions, an interdisciplinary theoretical background is
being set up (for suggestions and framework: see Cheng et al.,
2009; Reddy, 2014). Following the pattern matching observations
of cases, we select three deals that were particularly affected by the
host country's institutional laws for mergers, acquisitions, listing
norms, and international taxation. The cases were the Vodafo-
neeHutchison tax litigation deal and the Bharti AirteleMTN broken
deal in the telecom sector, and the VedantaeCairn India delayed
deal in oil and gas exploration. Thus, the common pattern in all
three cases is regulatory laws and provisions, and political inter-
vention. To the best of our knowledge from the media, two of the
three cases were highly represented in all leading TV channels (e.g.
CNBC, TV18, and ET Now) and ﬁnance-related daily news (e.g.
Economic Times, Business Standard, Business Line, and Financial
Express). Further, they appeared in international ﬁnance-related
dailies, such as the Financial Times and Reuters, and in ofﬁcial re-
ports from leading accounting agencies, such as KPMG, Deloitte,
and other host-country registered trading brokers. Finally yet
importantly, one of the three cases was long-time awaited and
challenged a tax petition in the apex court of India.
Moreover, emergent research on cross-border M&As' ‘comple-
tion’ in emerging markets (Muehlfeld et al., 2012; Zhang and He,2014; Zhang et al., 2011) and economic nationalism and institu-
tional factors around international direct investments (Dikova
et al., 2010; Serdar Dinc and Erel, 2013) have stimulated a study
that investigates ‘complex, intercultural, institutional and cross-
border negotiations’ for both new knowledge creation and theory
development. In fact, a study on merger/acquisition failure deals in
the international setting provides a unique setup in which to
perform in-depth and systematic analysis of a single case or across
cases. For example, Fang et al. (2004) and Meyer and Altenborg
(2007, 2008) explored the problems of incompatible strategies
(national cultures) and the disintegrating effects of equality in
foreign mergers using a failed merger between two state-owned
telecom ﬁrms in Scandinavian countries, i.e. Telia of Sweden and
Telenor of Norway. Wan and Wong (2009) investigated the eco-
nomic impact of political barriers and deeply analysed the stock
price changes of other U.S. oil ﬁrms attributable to CNOOC's (China)
unsuccessful takeover of Unocal (United States). Similarly, three
cross-border inbound acquisitions were critically examined in light
of the host country's institutional setup and the acquiring ﬁrms'
behaviour.
Unlike previous studies, the uniqueness of the deals are as fol-
lows: (i) a deal that completed, but was litigated for long-time in
the sample country's jurisdiction because of international taxes and
succeeded in favour of the acquirer, (ii) a deal that engaged in
extended merger talks in the ﬁrst round, was renegotiated in the
second round, and thenwas called off because of the deal structure,
national identity, and dual listing norms, and (iii) a deal that was
delayed and slowly materialized because of contract laws and open
offers issues. In particular, two deals were related to the telecom
business and the remaining deal was associatedwith the oil and gas
industry. A common thread in all three inbound-acquisition deals
was weak institutional laws and procedures, and erratic behaviour
by government ofﬁcials. In essence, big-capitalists, politicians, and
the government more closely inﬂuence telecom and capital goods
industries compared with other businesses, which usually captures
signiﬁcant asymmetric information. In this vein, Wan and Wong
(2009) mentioned that ‘barriers are particularly high in the en-
ergy sector but low in sectors not involving critical infrastructure’.
As such, the sample cases provide a rich setting in which to study
institutional laws, political intervention, and government involve-
ment in inbound direct investment deals.
The main characteristics of the sample cases were as follows: (a)
cross-border inbound acquisitions involving India as the host
country, (b) two cases related to the telecom business and the
remaining case related to oil and gas exploration, (c) one case out of
two delayed cases was found to be successful and the remaining
case was legally challenged after completion, (d) all cases received
public attention (were paid special attention), and (e) all cases were
affected by the host country's institutional, legal, political, and
ﬁnancial markets environment.2.2. Sampling time
The sampling time of the cases is as follows:
 Case 1: Starting date December 2006 e Closing date March
2012, for a total sampling time of 64 months (backward search
and observation);
 Case 2: Starting date February 2008 e Closing date November
2009, for a total sampling time of 22 months (backward search);
and
 Case 3: Starting date August 2010 e Closing date December
2011, for a total sampling time of 17months (forward search and
observation).
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announcement ﬁrst appeared in any of the national ﬁnance dailies
(e.g. Economic Times, Business Line, Financial Express, or Business
Standard). It should be noted that news might have appeared
before the acquirer made a formal announcement. The closing date
is the date on which negative news/a ﬁnal decision was published
in any the previously mentioned ﬁnance dailies. We also checked
the news with each respected company's web news, notices, and
reports (e.g. annual reports) to conﬁrm the authenticity of the data.
In fact, we created a Google Alerts to immediately obtain the news
about speciﬁc deals as they appeared on the World Wide Web.
Thus, the interval time of news delivery is ‘daily’. The total sampling
time represents ‘ﬁve years and four months’.
2.3. Case study protocol
A case study protocol records a set of actions and procedures
adopted in the given case method to ensure the trustworthiness of
the ﬁndings. For example, Yin (1994:41) suggested that researchers
should develop a well-considered set of actions rather than use
‘subjective’ judgements. The development of these actions, such as
acknowledging the mail, is useful particularly in a qualitative
research environment (Gibbert and Ruigrok, 2010). We cautiously
recorded every event of the doctoral research in electronic ﬁles,
including sample cases, case development, sampling time, data
source, data collection, case writing, and case publications, among
others (see Appendix A).
3. Cross-case analysis: key discussions
Using the extant literature and multiple case analyses, we seek
to discuss the key factors that determine the success or failure of an
international acquisition. However, we notice that some ﬁndings
are common across nations irrespective of the developed or
developing status of the host country, whereas few observations
are ‘special’ if the acquisitions are hosted by emerging economies
such as India. Therefore, acquiring ﬁrm managers and M&A advi-
sory ﬁrms should pay more attention to these special factors when
a target ﬁrm is associated with a developing nation. We discuss the
common and the special determinants through four strands:
organizational issues, deal characteristics, due diligence, and
external barriers (Fig. 1).
3.1. Organizational issues
Prior researchers suggested that deal completion is also inﬂu-
enced by ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, such as relevant business, ﬁrm
size, management expertise, and previous acquisition experience.
We support the theoretical notion that overseas acquisition success
not only depends on ﬁrm size and related businesses but also on a
ﬁrm's previous acquisition experience in the related business,
market, and level. For example, the Bharti AirteleMTN telecom deal
was called off because of both external and internal factors. Internal
factors, such as the ﬁrm's international outlook and prior deal
experience, might cause the deal to be delayed and/or not
completed. Moreover, although deep pockets and business exper-
tise in the telecom business existed, the deal became unsuccessful
because of a lack of professionalism in deal making. In contrast, the
VedantaeCairn India deal was delayed but was later completed
after all government approvals were obtained.We realize that deals
are also delayed if the acquiring ﬁrm has no experience in the
relevant business of the target ﬁrm. However, diversiﬁed business
groups achieve deal success because of their conglomerate's
diversiﬁcation, group size, and availability of cash reserves.
Therefore, large companies can sustain themselves in both relatedand unrelated businesses. Importantly, ﬁrms participating in
overseas acquisitions involving emerging economies will gain
relevant experience in deal making, acquire additional skills to
complete the proposed deal, and learn from the failures and suc-
cesses of negotiations. Further, the experience gained in emerging
economies is expected to result in positive future acquisition per-
formance. In sum, the acquiring ﬁrm that has prior acquisition
experience, an international outlook, related businesses, and deep
pockets may record success in subsequent deals, such as the
VodafoneeHutchison deal. In this case, we suggest that these
success factors enabled Vodafone to successfully complete the
Hutchison acquisition, prepare for entry into India, and win the tax
plea even after a long delay in judgement. Nevertheless, organi-
zations do not stop their learning because of success or failure but,
instead, learn and gain knowledge continuously to overcome
various obstacles in the future.
3.2. Deal-speciﬁc issues
Few studies suggested that a deal's structure in terms of type of
deal, payment structure, and M&A advisors' expertise affects its
completion. We seek to answer why (how) a deal's structure de-
termines its success. For the case analysis, deal structure has been
discussed more as an ‘ownership strategy’ in ﬁnance rather than a
‘general strategy’ in strategic management or IB. We provide two
reasons for this classiﬁcation. Firstly, what percentage of equity
should be acquired to gain control over the target ﬁrm? Secondly,
what payment mode (cash, stock, or both) should the acquiring
ﬁrm adopt without diluting ownership and control beneﬁts?
Further, the payment mode is inﬂuenced by the accounting and
taxation laws in the given host economy (Epstein, 2005). Logically,
if the acquiring ﬁrm wants full control over the target ﬁrm, then it
should pay cash to the target ﬁrm's shareholders. Assuming that
the acquiring ﬁrm paid or issued stock to the target ﬁrm's share-
holders, then one could see the dilution in ownership that leads to
questions of who has better control over the target ﬁrm and who
will enjoy the ﬁrm's earnings. For example, the Bharti AirteleMTN
telecom deal failed tomaterialize because of its deal structure. Both
ﬁrms wanted to control the post-merger entity by giving the
company a dual listing in India and South Africa. In addition to the
beneﬁts of a dual listing, both ﬁrms would face agency and infor-
mation asymmetry problems. The impact of the dual listing would
cause payment options to change, thereby attracting regulatory
obstacles (e.g. open offers) and other issues (e.g. political inter-
vention). If they could have perceived an acquisition strategy other
than a merger, the deal would have completed with a better
ownership and control mechanism, a cash payment, a non-
compete agreement, and others. Conversely, because of prior in-
ternational deal experience in developed economies, Vodafone
avoided paying capital gain taxes to the Indian government after
acquiring the Hutchison equity stake in CGP Investments, thus
controlling Hutchison-Essar Ltd. From these observations, we
suggest that good deals save signiﬁcant transaction costs, whereas
bad deals create numerous inherent problems that lead to broken
pre-merger negotiations or post-merger integration. Following the
Vodafone strategy, Vedanta Resources obtained controlling rights
in Cairn India by acquiring Cairn Energy's equity stake. Hence,
Vedanta could not avoid paying taxes to the government because of
the greenﬁeld investment made by Cairn Energy when it entered
India. Therefore, we suggest that the acquiring ﬁrm's managers and
M&A advisory ﬁrms should be aware of the qualitative attributes of
deal characteristics, such as ownership and control beneﬁts, pay-
ment modes, non-compete agreements, cross-listings, break-up
fees, and so forth. In addition, M&A advisors should work to com-
plete deals that lead to signiﬁcant advisory fees and commissions.
Fig. 1. Determinants of cross-border inbound deal completion across sample cases.
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Previous studies suggested that due diligence issues also
determine the success of deals in domestic and overseas settings.
Due diligence is an examination of the target's business for various
reasons, including capital structure, ownership rights, product
proﬁles, contingent contracts, legal disputes, taxation disputes, and
ﬁnancial performance (Epstein, 2005). In the given research, the
VedantaeCairn India deal attracted due diligence problems,
particularly the royalty payment controversy between Cairn En-
ergy, ONGC, and the Ministry of Petroleum. Further, the deal was
delayed because ONGC has pre-emptive rights in one of the oil
ﬁelds owned by Cairn India. For that reason, Cairn Energy strove to
obtain approvals from the respective government departments and
the petroleum ministry. Thus, we suggest that acquiring ﬁrm
managers should not exploit funds at the expense of shareholder
commitment. In other words, the M&A advisory team and the
acquiring ﬁrm's due diligence team should inspect and clarify any
issues before ﬁnalizing, agreeing to, and transferring payment.
3.4. Country-speciﬁc determinants
Accessible literature on direct international investments and
overseas M&As performed in various national settings found thatthe economic, ﬁnancial, legal, regulatory, governmental, political,
cultural, and geographical factors affect both pre-acquisition
completion and post-acquisition integration. In particular, the
behaviour of the host country's government authorities, strong
political institutions cum political stability, rule of law, control of
corruption, and white collar crimes and regulatory quality together
create a favourable institutional environment that allows foreign
ﬁrms to invest in the given economy (Reis et al., 2013; Stein and
Daude, 2001). At the same time, the environment allows foreign
ﬁrms to reduce transaction costs during the market entry process.
Reis et al. (2013) suggested that developed country MNCsmust face
institutional difﬁculties (law, corruption, crime, political interven-
tion) when making deals with target ﬁrms in developing countries.
For instance, a typical case in the Indian court system takes
approximately 20 years to come to a ﬁnal decision (as cited in
Armour and Lele, 2008). As such, we examine foreign acquisitions
at the acquisition process or deal completion stage. For example,
two out of the three cases e VodafoneeHutchison and Vedan-
taeCairn India e faced external difﬁculties, such as underdevel-
oped laws, legal formalities, erratic behaviour of government
ofﬁcials, and political intervention. This streak supports the
empirical ﬁnding of Reis et al. (2013) through the fact that both
Vedanta and Vodafone were based in the developed country of the
United Kingdom and then invested in the developing economy of
1 Sovereign risk is deﬁned as ‘any situation, where a sovereign defaults on loan
contracts with foreigners, seizes foreign assets located within its borders, or pre-
vents domestic residents from fully meeting obligations to foreign contracts’ (Alfaro
et al., 2008).
K.S. Reddy et al. / Paciﬁc Science Review B: Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (2015) 22e44 29India. Given its international outlook, prior deal experience, and
management expertise, Vodafone and Vedanta triumphed over the
regulatory hurdles and then successfully completed the deals. By
and large, the Bharti AirteleMTN deal faced severe institutional
hurdles, such as an open offers programme, dual listing norms, and
shareholder rights. The deal was called off ‘twice’ and, thereby, the
companies decided not to renegotiate in the future. In this vein, we
are not convinced that the cultural distance between India and
South Africa truly inﬂuenced merger negotiations (because the two
countries have good economic and social relations). If so, the deal
should have been revoked in the ﬁrst inning. Given the home
country's strict regulations, Bharti Airtel acquired Kuwait-based
Zain Telecom and gained a business opportunity over the African
market. On the basis of the case analysis, we suggest that govern-
ment ofﬁcials' erratic nature and the ruling political party's inﬂu-
ence will be stronger in foreign inward deals characterized by
higher bid values, a listed company, and cash payments. The strong
reason behind such an inﬂuence could be a ‘personal ﬁnancial and/
or non-ﬁnancial beneﬁt’, which is behind the screen and under the
table. Given the institutional dichotomy, inward acquisitions are
typically delayed and/or fail without any public announcement
being made. Lastly, bidding managers and M&A advisors should
pay more attention to the host country's ruling political party and
other institutional factors when making long-term investments in
countries such as India and China. Geographical factors such as
distance and culture do not explain the sample cases.
4. Theory testing and case illustrations
Strategy, IB, and ﬁnance researchers explored the phenomenon
of a ﬁrm reporting signiﬁcant growth when choosing a corporate
inorganic model versus an organic model. For instance, growth can
be viewed in terms of synergies' market share, proﬁtability,
competitive advantage, economies of scale, new market experi-
ences, and so forth. The model identiﬁed in this research is an
‘acquisition’ and a cross-border deal. In addition, U.S.- and UK-
based e and other developed-country-based e multinationals
internationalized their operations, corporate ownership, and
products and services through mergers and/or acquisitions. Simi-
larly, recent research on emerging economies illustrated that
emerging-market ﬁrms are adopting and, thereby, following past
and current strategies of developed-country MNCs for survival and
excellence.
This section aims to test 17 theories propounded in different
business research disciplines, such as the Caves and Hymer theory
of FDI, Dunning's eclectic theory, the Uppsala theory of ﬁrm inter-
nationalization, Penrose's resource-based-view theory, North's
institutional theory, Hymer's thought of liability of foreignness,
Jensen and Meckling's agency theory, and Fama's market efﬁciency
theory, to cite a few (Table 1). We also look up an important the-
orem of ‘learning-by-doing’ in organization studies. Special tasks
such as pre-testing (Reddy et al., 2014a), revisiting the post-testing
task, and reinforcing theoretical constructs in this paper will
improve the current knowledge that refers to the impact of insti-
tutional distance on cross-border M&A completion.
5. Farmers Fox Theory: revisited and reinforced
As mentioned in previous sections, a few recent studies tested
and advanced the knowledge of the resource-based view, trans-
action cost economics, and agency and institutional theories (Xu
and Meyer, 2013). Albeit, scholars suggested that emerging mar-
kets represent unique settings that offer the ability to obtain fresh
insights to expand the theory (Bruton et al., 2008) and to develop
new theories and testable propositions. For example, Wright et al.(2005:24) suggested an important research argument: ‘to what
extent do problems arising from institutional differences increase
transaction and agency costs and lead to exit by foreign entrants?’
Similarly, Xu and Meyer (2013) also stressed the importance of
studying institutional perspectives in foreign market entry strate-
gies in emerging markets whilst linking theory to the context.
Further, recent papers published in leading ﬁnance and IB journals
discussed the signiﬁcance of institutional distance and economic
nationalism in cross-border M&As (Barbopoulos et al., 2014; Hur
et al., 2011; Reis et al., 2013; Serdar Dinc and Erel, 2013; Wan,
2005; Wang, 2013). Therefore, we realize that new theories based
on the emerging markets phenomenon should draw more atten-
tion to the institutional environment and its impact on the inter-
nationalization process. In this vein, Hur et al. (2011) tested the
hypothesis ‘the quality of host countries’ institutions positively
affects the cross-border M&A inﬂows'. Nagano (2013) also tested
the hypothesis that ‘an enhancement of IPR protection law in the
host-country encourages inward greenﬁeld FDI and that of SHR
protection law promotes cross-border M&A’. Reis et al. (2013)
propounded a few testable propositions in light of institutional
distance and cross-border M&A completion.
With these studies in mind, we establish a triangular association
between systemic multi-case analysis, extant M&A literature, and
theory testing. Before introducing new theory, the case study
protocol is to disclose missing threads in the existing literature. We
ﬁnd very few research questions, but they were largely unexplored
in emerging markets phenomenon that raised new avenues to
enhance the literature in IB, strategy, and economics. For example,
Lucas (1990) argued, ‘why does not capital ﬂow from developed
(rich) to developing (poor) countries’, and developed the theorem
using the Indian setting. Lucas postulated that developing countries
were not able to receive investments from rich countries because of
weak regulatory laws (e.g. investor protection, ﬁnancial disclosures,
ownership rights) and their poor implementation. Lucas mainly
argued that sovereign risk1 (e.g. political) and asymmetric infor-
mation are higher in poor countries because of improper laws and
weaker regulatory enforcement that negatively affect foreign in-
ﬂows when receiving from rich nations. Further, Lucas also dis-
cussed the external advantages of human capital (labour),
technology transfers, and imperfect market conditions. Alfaro et al.
(2008) empirically tested the theory and considered a sample of 50
countries during the 1971e1998 period and suggested that insti-
tutional quality has been a major determinant in explaining the
Lucas paradox. In such cases, we argue that poor countries are
losing signiﬁcant economic (e.g. taxes) and non-economic in-
centives (e.g. skills and expertise) because of the erratic nature of
their administration, political intervention, and unsecured investor
rights. The missing link is that poor countries are allowing foreign
investments but are severely losing economic beneﬁts, such as
revenue taxes, capital gains taxes, and border taxes, in addition to
weak governance. This streak seems to be an old argument; how-
ever, no previous study postulated that a given country's govern-
ment needs to face economic (revenue) risk because of weak
institutional laws. Thus, we seek to develop a new theory on the
basis of the research question: how (does) a poor county hosting
foreign investments undergo economic loss while proﬁting the
host party (acquirer or target)? Indeed, some important arguments
that previous scholars raised also support the research question.
For instance, Reis et al. (2013) developed several theoretical
Table 1
Theory testing and case illustrations.
Theory Theoretical construct VodafoneeHutchison deal Bharti AirteleMTN deal VedantaeCairn India
Theory of foreign direct
investment (Hymer,
1970; IMF)
A foreign national enterprise
acquiring 10% or more of the
ownership control in a ﬁrm
targeted in a host country results
in capital and other resource
transfers.
Vodafone Group Plc is Britain's
diversiﬁed telecom MNC with an
offshore subsidiary VIH located in
the Netherlands. In contrast,
Hutchison Whampoa Limited
(HWL) is Hong Kong's largest
conglomerate MNC and has an on-
shore Asian subsidiary ﬁrm HTIL,
headquartered in Hong Kong. HTIL
has a 100% equity stake in CGP
Investments (Holdings) Limited,
located in the Cayman Islands.
Both MNCs have signiﬁcant equity
interests in their respective
subsidiaries. The key point was
that CGP owns a 51.95% indirect
shareholding in Hutchison Essar
Limited (an Indian-listed entity).
Vodafone bought HTIL's holdings
in CGP Investments through its
subsidiary ﬁrm VIH for US$10.9
billion.
Bharti Airtel is India's leading
telecom company and MTN is a
principal telecom company in the
African market based in South
Africa. Both planned to merge and
create a consolidated ﬁrm through
a cross-country dual listing. As a
result, Bharti Airtel would receive
49% of the ownership rights in the
newly consolidated ﬁrm, whereas
MTN shareholders would receive
approximately 36% of the equity
interest, or US$23 billion. Thus, the
deal structure in terms of
ownership rights or equity
interests (10%) supports the theory
of FDI.
Vedanta Resources Plc, which has
an Indian origin, operates from its
headquarters in London, UK. Cairn
Energy is a UK-origin ﬁrm, has a
signiﬁcant equity stake in the
Indian-based ﬁrm Cairn India Ltd,
and engages in oil exploration.
Following the FDI theory, Vedanta
Resources was observed to have
acquired an approximate 58.5%
equity stake in Cairn India Ltd for
US$8.67 billion. As such, this
acquisition represents more than
the minimum equity stake of 10%
as put forward by the IMF and
other notable novel authors such
as Hymer.
Market imperfections
theory (Hymer, 1970;
Rugman et al., 2011)
Markets or industries become
imperfect because of information
asymmetry and uncertainty
decisions taken by the
government.
The Indian telecommunications
sector is one of the imperfect
markets in Asia. In this case,
Vodafone indirectly invested in a
given economy through the direct
acquisition of the HTIL stake in
CGP Investments. More notably,
when Hutchison entered India, it
was a single entity and a globally
diversiﬁed and telecom MNC,
which was experienced in
providing multi-utilized and
differentiated services in European
markets. In fact, both Vodafone
and Hutchison have a better
understanding of the terms and
cooperative agreements in most
European markets. Post-
acquisition, Vodafone would gain a
mobile subscription base, market
share, and revenue. To our
knowledge, this deal has been
augmented by Vodafone's market
strength and international
business network.
In fact, the Indian telecom market
is largely controlled by
government-owned ﬁrms,
whereas the mobile
communications market is
signiﬁcantly shared by private
ﬁrms, including Bharti Airtel,
Reliance, Idea, and BSNL, among
others. Because of the
government's heavy control, the
market became imperfect in terms
of pricing and packages. If the deal
had been successful, the combined
entity would have beneﬁtted in
terms of subscriber base, market
share, price control, and
competitive advantage, together
enhancing revenues and brand
recognition in India and South
Africa.
In countries such as India, the oil
and gas industry is largely
controlled by government-owned
enterprises. Moreover, the
industry is an imperfect market in
terms of production norms, trade
dealings, and pricing controls.
Importantly, the ruling and
opposition political parties play
vital roles in ﬁxing oil and gas
prices. Altogether, these factors
deﬁne an imperfect market. We
understood that Vedanta
Resources has to bear additional
transaction costs related to the
location of the acquired business
because of no previous experience
in the relevant business. However,
it is able to manage all costs given
the origin of its business group and
nationality.
Theory of transaction cost
economics (Coase,
1937; Williamson,
1981)
The business activity cost is
directly proportionate to the
degree of ﬁrm knowledge of
various internal and external
resources of the host country,
particularly resulting in higher
costs attributable to information
spillover when a local ﬁrm
acquires a foreign ﬁrm.
Regarding this theory, we use the
‘VodafoneeHutchison deal’ to
represent transaction costs. In
particular, the cost of a deal
depends on the method that they
(buyer and seller) use to conduct a
valuation of Hutchison (HTIL and
its share in Indian joint venture
business) and the market
potential. (The analysis falls within
corporate ﬁnance-valuation
theory or the accounting going-
concern concept.) However, we
argue that the transaction cost of
the deal increased signiﬁcantly
from the delay in the court
proceedings and judgement. For
example, costs included those
related to legal proceedings, legal
documentation, court charges and
fees, media, and other related
factors. Moreover, predicting or
estimating the trade-off among
deal value, market potential, and
uncommon regulatory shocks
(costs) is difﬁcult. However, one
cannot imagine the effect of
This theory directly explains the
Bharti AirteleMTN deal. The deal
was called-off during two
successive negotiations that
occurred in 2008 and 2009. Finally,
both parties agreed not to
materialize the deal because of
regulatory hurdles. Further, both
parties failed to discuss the deal's
break-up fee. That both companies
spent signiﬁcant amounts for the
transaction, such as on M&A
advisory fees, legal fees, and other
deal logistics fees, including
overseas conveyance costs, is
worth mentioning. We support
this theory, which refers to the fact
that companies may need to spend
some amount that directly affects
their income statements
regardless of deal completion or
incompletion.
We critically examine the case
using secondary information and
news broadcasted in electronic
media. The deal between Vedanta
and Cairn India was delayed by
external factors and certain
internal factors, such as due
diligence. Hence, the deal was
delayed because of an open offers
programme, government
approvals, and political
intervention. Thus, we suggest that
both Vedanta and Cairn India
might have spent a signiﬁcant
amount on deal completion. Such
costs adversely affect accounting
earnings. Further, shareholders
expressed disagreement with the
deal consequences. If the deal
could have been successful at the
time, Vedanta would have saved
on deal expenses and focused on
post-merger integration without
spending on additional transaction
costs.
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Theory Theoretical construct VodafoneeHutchison deal Bharti AirteleMTN deal VedantaeCairn India
unusual government behaviour or
actions. When time-bound, one
must face these challenges when
entering countries such as India.
Internalization theory
(Hymer, 1970; Buckley
and Casson, 2009)
An international ﬁrm buying a ﬁrm
located in another country can
enhance market opportunities and
minimize costs by integrating
target resources or target
operations across various markets.
We strongly believe that the size
and ownership structure of the
corporate headquarters of
multinationals play a key role in
the internalization process of
being effective or worse (Collis
et al., 2012). In other words,
signiﬁcant coordination,
cooperation, and control occurred
between Vodafone and its
subsidiary VIH. Similarly, a good
understanding must exist of the
ownership transfer between
Hutchison Whampoa and its
subsidiaries e particularly HTIL e
and CGP Investments Holdings. In
sum, such business relations
across national borders are helpful
when entering a third-party
country location such as India. We
suggest that internalization played
an important role in both the
completion of the deal and in
winning tax controversies in the
Indian courts. In fact, the
transaction cost was reduced
because of no capital gains tax.
Internalization helps companies
with businesses in telecom
services to minimize costs by
integrating products offered in
different markets. If the deal could
have been completed within the
period, the newly consolidated
entity would have gained market
resources by integrating telecom
services in India and South Africa.
For example, the post-merger ﬁrm
would have had a new market
opportunity to expand into other
Asian economies, such as Sri Lanka,
Pakistan, Bangladesh, and others.
At the same time, it would have
gained markets in the African
region. Altogether, the new entity
could have integrated markets
through technology and human
capital that would have reduced
transaction costs and improved
revenues, proﬁts, and average
revenue per user.
Multinational ﬁrms experience
internalization advantages by
integrating various resources or
products in different markets.
Vedanta is an Indian origin
diversiﬁed business group
operating businesses in zinc,
aluminium, and iron ore. We
strongly believe that Vedanta
eCairn India Ltd could save
signiﬁcant amounts on transaction
costs by integrating several
interlinked operations involved in
various businesses in India. The
greater internalization advantage
is related to the human resources
employed in the diversiﬁed group
of business activities. This
advantage would positively affect
the ﬁnancial statements, such as
by reducing market integration
costs and improving earnings.
Eclectic paradigm, or OLI
framework (Dunning,
1977, 1980)
A ﬁrm acquiring another ﬁrm
largely seeks to beneﬁt from
corporate ownership, control,
location, and internalization that
positively improve ﬁrm value.
Ownership advantages: Vodafone
Group Plc is a parent corporation
that, through its subsidiary VIH,
acquired the 100% equity stake in
CGP Investments owned by
Hutchison Whampoa's subsidiary
HTIL. As a result, Vodafone has
become the major partner with its
51.95% equity holdings in the
Indian-based joint venture
Hutchison-Essar (HEL). Further,
Vodafone acquired an additional
22% equity stake in Vodafone India
Limited (VIL) from its joint venture
partner Essar Group.
Location advantages: From a post-
acquisition decision, we strongly
believe that Vodafone can
experience market scope by
differentiating its services. Thus,
the market-seeking motive is an
accomplishment that meets the
criteria of Dunning's eclectic
paradigm.
Internalization advantages:
Because it is a global giant in the
telecom business, Vodafone will
save various transaction costs by
integrating services offered in
different markets. This integration
is possible through the
internalization of technology and
human capital.
Ownership advantages: Bharti
Airtel and MTN decided to create a
new combined entity by giving the
ﬁrm a dual listing option. If the
proposed deal could have been
successful in the second inning,
Bharti Airtel would have held a
49% interest in the post-merger
ﬁrm, whereas MTN would have
held 36%. A signiﬁcant ownership
interest would lead to fewer
agency problems if the entity had
operated in India through Bharti
AirteleMTN and in South Africa
through MTNeSouth Africa.
Location advantages: Many
researchers postulated that the
Indian and South African markets
have signiﬁcant potential in the
telecom services business. If the
deal had succeeded, the post-
merger ﬁrm would have gained
market share, sales, average
revenue per user, proﬁts, and a
competitive advantage, which
together would have supported
Dunning's theory.
Internalization advantages: These
advantages refer to ﬁrms reducing
various transaction costs that
occur in different markets by
integrating internalized
operations (technology, human
capital). We believe that this deal
would have achieved
internalization advantages if the
entity had been successful in the
second inning.
Ownership advantages: Vedanta
Resources is one of the leading
business groups registered in the
United Kingdom and has both
ownership control and signiﬁcant
experience in the materials
business. Through this deal,
Vedanta owns approximately
58.5% of the equity interests that
lead to the creation of additional
rights regarding board formation
and long-term strategic dictions.
Further, Vedanta could gain better
experience in new business ‘oil
exploration’.
Location advantages: As discussed,
Vedanta Resources is of Indian
origin and operates businesses in
iron ore, zinc, and others, both in
India and overseas. We propose
that Vedanta's business value will
improve because of its location
experience and management
expertise, including the advantage
of nationality. Following this
advantage, Vedanta could ensure
its presence in the oil business and
create value to its shareholders.
Internalization advantages: In
addition to the newly acquired oil
exploration business, Vedanta has
been engaged in trade in other
diversiﬁed business segments in
India, including zinc, iron ore, and
others. By integrating various
business operations within the
business group, Vedanta is
expected to enjoy beneﬁts from
internalization.
Uppsala theory of
internationalization
(Johanson and
Wiedersheim-Paul,
Organizations doing business in
other countries through
incremental stages (exports to
production facility) can increase
The case does not support the
theoretical construct of the
Uppsala theory because of the
direct foreign investment.
The case does not support the
theoretical construct of the
Uppsala theory because of the
direct foreign investment.
The case does not support the
theoretical construct of the
Uppsala theory because of the
direct foreign investment.
(continued on next page)
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1975; Johanson and
Vahlne, 1977, 2009)
their overall business value while
hedging the foreignness and
newness risks with the host
country.
However, Vodafone is not new in
internationalizing its operations.
For instance, the company's global
presence in terms of number of
markets has increased
dramatically, by three-fold, from
12 in 1998 to 38 in 2007, and
thereafter augmented to 40 in
2011. We understand that
Vodafone is a globally diversiﬁed
telecommunications MNC that
offers various premium services in
different markets. According to
this theory, Vodafone entered
across developed and developing
economies through incremental
decision making. Of course, this
decision made the company the
world's second largest telecom
operator based on subscribers
scale. The deal would assist the
company in further diversifying in
other South Asian and East Asian
countries.
Moreover, a foreign acquisition is
not a series of incremental
processes of doing business abroad
but is an inorganic strategy to gain
direct market control and
ownership impact. However, we
accept that the newly combined
entity will gain all of the
advantages as per the fourth step
of the theory (offering services by
creating own company) if the deal
had been completed.
Moreover, a foreign acquisition or
a merger is not a series of
incremental processes of doing
business abroad but is an inorganic
strategy to gain direct market
control and ownership. In the case
of the oil business, the acquiring
ﬁrm can earn signiﬁcant revenues
by minimizing costs at the plant
level instead of through the
decision to ‘built and own the
plant’ (fourth step of the theory).
Vedanta's business value will
improve in proportion to the
acquired oil business because of its
previous experiences with Indian
businesses and international
management expertise.
Long-purse (deep
pockets) theory
(Hymer, 1970;
Montgomery, 1994)
A ﬁrm featuring higher levels of
cash ﬂows or reserves, or deep
pockets, actively participates in
inorganic growth strategies such
as mergers, acquisitions, joint
ventures, and others.
Because of internalization
advantages and international
experience in various global
markets, Vodafone has gained
signiﬁcant cash ﬂows by
minimizing costs through the
integration of services and
operations in different markets. As
a result, the company's accounting
statements have improved in
terms of revenue and proﬁts, and
creating deeper pockets. For this
reason, Vodafone acquired
Hutchison by making a cash offer.
In addition, the company obtained
quick deal ﬁnancing from global
investment banks because of its
strong equity claim.
On the basis of the ﬁnancial
statements, we understood that
both Bharti Airtel and MTN have
signiﬁcant cash reserves to make
strategic investments for long-
term success. We believe that both
companies sought to improve their
cash ﬂows by following an
internalization strategy that
enabled them to minimize costs
and improve sales by integrating
various services in India and South
Africa. Apart from the cash mode
of the deal payment, the company
received ﬁnancing options from
investment banks.
The accounting and strategy
literature make it evident that big
businesses or diversiﬁed groups
maintain sufﬁcient cash reserves
or deep pockets. In particular,
business groups can quickly
arrange ﬁnancing through their
wholly owned subsidiaries both
for organic and inorganic growth
of the business. Thus, Vedanta
acquired Cairn Energy's stake in
Cairn India and arranged the
payment from its deep pockets
and by using stock options offered
by its Indian-based subsidiaries.
Resource-based-view
theory (Penrose, 1959;
Wernerfelt, 1984)
A bidder having sophisticated
resources actively participates in
inorganic strategies to both
internalize target resources and
improve its ﬁrm value.
We test this theory through the
ownership view and the proﬁt
(growth) view. As of March 31,
2012, Vodafone had a 64.4%
interest in VIL through its wholly
owned subsidiaries and a further
20.1% indirect holding, resulting in
an aggregate 84.5% equity interest
or capital control (VGP-AR,
2012:118). Vodafone's subscriber
base in India increased
considerably, from 22.31 million in
2006 to 147.75 million in 2011,
representing a massive growth
rate of 534%. We suggest that this
momentous market growth
helped Vodafone acquire an
additional 22% equity stake in VIL
from its joint venture partner
‘Essar Group’ for £2.6 billion on
July 1, 2011. It is worth stating that
Vodafone very cleverly increased
its ownership in VIL subsequent to
its progress in the Indian
subscriber base.
Previous researchers tested this
theory using successful merger or
acquisition deals and found that an
acquiring ﬁrm can develop an
empire network and improve its
ﬁnancial performance with the
assistance of the target ﬁrm's
resources. However, the broken
telecom deal between Bharti Airtel
and MTN is inappropriate for
conducting an examination from
the lens of this theory. Hence, the
post-merger combined ﬁrm would
have reported signiﬁcant growth
in ﬁnancial indicators (e.g.
revenue, proﬁt, stock earnings,
cash ﬂows) if the proposed deal
had been successful in the second
inning. Moreover, both ﬁrms have
potential market beneﬁts,
technology transfer advantages,
and management expertise in the
given telecom business.
At the outset, we argue that
Vedanta has no previous
experience in the oil business,
which would be a negative signal
to the market and unfavourably
affect business performance.
Because of the diversiﬁed business
group, international outlook, and
location experience, Vedanta's
business value is expected to
signiﬁcantly improve given better
utilization of the target ﬁrm's
resources, such as technology,
human capital, and oil exploration
expertise. Moreover, Cairn
Energy's oil business expertise and
technology advantage would help
VedantaeCairn India with
resource allocation and
management. Thus, Vedanta has a
signiﬁcant opportunity to improve
its ﬁrm value.
Resource dependence
theory (Pfeffer and
Salancik, 1978)
A strongmotive behind acquiring a
ﬁrm in other countries is to reduce
resource dependence at the
expense of target resources that
signiﬁcantly improve business
experience and value.
Through the lens of the theory,
Vodafone has an international
outlook, management expertise,
and sophisticated experience in
the telecom business that,
together, improve its business
value and positively affect the
Indian-based business. In
We admit that testing this theory
using the broken deal between
Bharti Airtel and MTN Group is not
rational. If the proposed deal had
been successful, the post-merger
ﬁrm would have gained market
advantages through service
integration in India and South
Because of no prior experience in
the oil business, Vedanta may not
have better control over both
internal and external resources. In
fact, the oil and gas industry is
primarily controlled by
government ﬁrms in India, which
creates problems of imperfection
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particular, Vodafone can save a
signiﬁcant amount of various
internal costs and gain
internalization advantages by
integrating a number of services in
different markets. It can also
compete with both Indian and
international players in the
telecom market. However,
Vodafone may not control the
external resources in India because
the telecom market is one of the
highly regulated businesses and
operates in an imperfect market. In
another sense, Vodafone must
follow the principle of making
better use of every opportunity
whilst overcoming external
obstacles. Vodafone increased its
ownership stake, gained full
control, and thereby created the
Indian-based ﬁrm as a wholly
owned subsidiary.
Africa. Both companies may have
had better control over internal
resources, such as human capital,
cash ﬂows, and technology, but
they may not have managed the
external resources in the form of
market, pricing, and taxation
opportunities. A strong reason is
that the telecom services business
is one of the highly regulated
sectors in India and is
characteristic of an imperfect
market.
related to pricing, supply, and
contracts. However, given the
location advantage and a business
group of Indian origin, Vedanta is
expected to have better
opportunities to efﬁciently use
both internal and external
resources. Primarily, diversiﬁed
business experience assists in
obtaining quick control over
resources related to oil
exploration, such as operational
activities and transaction costs.
Thereafter, the company will have
control over external resources by
sharing contracts and projects
with other companies to ensure
further opportunities in the given
market.
Theory of competitive
advantage (Porter,
1985, 1990)
Acquiring a ﬁrm's market share or
competitive advantage increases
when a target's business is
characterized by competition.
We test this theory from two
perspectives, namely Vodafone's
view and the host country's view.
On the one hand, before entering
the Indian landscape, Vodafone
gained a worthy competitive
advantage in the Europeanmarket.
In particular, the competitive
advantage came from being a low-
cost service provider, offering
service differentiation (for
instance, one can watch recent
innovative advertisements on
Vodafone services), and focussing
on speciﬁc markets, such as the
semi-urban and rural markets.
Akdogu (2009) suggested that
telecom ﬁrms gain a competitive
edge through acquisitions. Indian
telecom consumers experience
advanced services such as 3G, 4G,
and other allied products. Since
1994, Indian mobile customers
have been attracted primarily by
different mobile speciﬁcations and
features, and by service
differentiation.
Bharti Airtel was found to be a
leading telecom company in India
with a reference market share and
subscriber base. Similarly, theMTN
Group was also a top player in
telecom services in the African
region. If the proposed deal had
been successful, the post-merger
ﬁrm would have gained two
emergingmarkets opportunities to
enhance their subscriber bases and
market shares. Given the potential
in the telecom business in India
and the African region, the
combined entity would have
gained a competitive advantage in
terms of technology transfer, cost
reduction, average revenue per
user, service delivery, customer
retention, and others.
Based on the theory, a ﬁrm should
gain a competitive advantage by
acquiring the business of the target
ﬁrm in a given industry and
country. Hence, because of no
previous experience in the oil
business, Vedanta will strive to
gain a competitive advantage
against established local
companies, such as ONGC,
Reliance, and others. However,
Vedanta can save signiﬁcantly on
various logistics costs and gain
internalization advantages
through market integration in the
long term. The cost leadership
advantages are usually based at
the operational level, at which a
ﬁrm can acquire skills in the long
term by following the principle of
‘learning-by-doing’.
Organizational learning
theory (Penrose, 1959;
Cangelosi and Dill,
1965; Hymer, 1970;
Francis et al., 2014)
Firms gain and store knowledge
from their previous experiences
and other experiences, which
positively results in future
attempts related to, for example,
negotiations, acquisitions, and
integration.
This case is the best example for
explaining what Vodafone and
Hutchison have experienced to
date in the given economic setting.
We found factors such as stress,
control of internal factors,
experience of external shocks,
patience, and other associated
knowledge factors. We state that
Vodafone could strengthen its
future internationalization plans
through its experiences in (with)
India (government ofﬁcials). For
instance, the company might have
improved its knowledge, liability
of foreignness, liability of
localness, liability of newness,
informal relationships with the
current Indian public
administration and judicial
system, telecom market potential,
and so forth, of economic, legal,
and administrative behaviour.
Measuring knowledge/experience
The broken deal in the telecom
business provides signiﬁcant deal
acquisition experience to
managers of Bharti Airtel and the
MTN Group. In addition, M&A
advisors could learn how to
negotiate and formulate a deal
structure associated with
developing countries, such as India
and Africa. Both ﬁrms faced serious
regulatory hurdles related to open
offers and deal listing, and this
experience will enhance the
chances of deal completion in
future strategies. For this reason
and after the deal failed, Bharti
Airtel acquired Kuwait-based Zain
Telecom for US$10.1 billion. This
move infers that previous
acquisition experience (success or
failure) inﬂuences future deal
making in overseas markets.
Brieﬂy, both organizations could
learn good lessons from the
While supporting the case proofs
of the organizational learning
theory, we found that Vedanta
gained some experience in
overseas deal making, particularly
in conglomerate deals involving
developing countries such as India.
In addition to Vedanta's
experience with Indian businesses
and prior acquisition experience,
managers and M&A advisors faced
new challenges in foreign
acquisition negotiations that
included institutional barriers,
regulatory hurdles related to open
offers and ownership, due
diligence, and political
intervention. Therefore, we
postulate that this experience
improved Vedanta's and its
managers' organizational learning
in overcoming various external
barriers when investing in
developing countries.
(continued on next page)
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is too difﬁcult. We suggest that the
institutional, regulatory, and
economic systems exhibited in
India would adversely affect MNCs
if established for the short term
and beneﬁt MNCs if established for
the long term.
broken talks that occurred in two
successive innings.
Learning-by-doing
(Collins et al., 2009;
Aktas et al., 2013)
Organizations not only learn from
their previous experiences but also
learn (gain and store knowledge)
by doing things in the current
setting that positively result in
future attempts related to
acquisitions.
As mentioned in the Vodafone
proﬁle, in 2000 the company
acquired Germany's Mannesmann
for US$186 billion, representing
the largest deal in Vodafone's
corporate history. In 2006,
Vodafone sold its Japanese unit to
Softbank and its Swedish unit to
Telenor. […] more recently, its
Netherlands-based ﬁrm, Vodafone
Libertel BV, acquired
Telespectrum-DJ. Thus, we
understand that Vodafone
accumulated signiﬁcant inorganic-
strategy experience, such as with
alliances, network coordination,
mergers, acquisitions, joint
ventures, and sell-offs, before
acquiring Hutchison's stake in the
Indian operations. Therefore, we
agree with the theorem from
Collins et al. (2009) that stated that
‘ﬁrms learn (acquire) new
knowledge (Indian operations),
and a ﬁrm's prior acquisition
experience increases the chances
of subsequent overseas deals’.
Bharti Airtel was found to lack an
international outlook and prior
acquisition experience, whereas
the MTN Group has a global
outlook but no previous deal-
making experience. Thus, we put
forward a comment that both
companies could learn from the
broken deal to improve the
chances of successful participation
in future deals. Managers could
learn about deal structures,
payment modes, non-compete
fees, and break fees, and gain
experience with government
ofﬁcials, politicians, and regulatory
hurdles. On-going experience also
reduces the liability of localness
and improves deal expertise.
In addition to the organizational
learning context, we also study the
case from the lens of learning-by-
doing. We found one important
point: Vedanta's experience in
overseas deal making and the new
opportunity in the oil exploration
business should positively affect
its business value and learning
curve. The conglomerate
acquisition enables Vedanta to
acquire new skills related to
management expertise at both the
corporate and the operational
levels, cost leadership, and
technology transfer. Together,
these skills will enhance the
group's business value in terms of
sales, earnings, and stock price.
This streak supports the construct
of ‘learning-by-doing’.
Bargaining power theory
(Luo, 2001)
A bidding ﬁrm acquires a target
registered in another country by
improving negotiations with the
host country government to
eventually reduce the information
asymmetry and the cost of doing
business in that country.
This theory postulates that a
foreign MNC can succeed in the
given host economy if its company
managers choose better market
entry modes whilst bargaining
with the government. In the given
case, the deal occurred outside the
territory of the Indian government,
and Vodafone faced no tax liability.
In addition to no proper law,
government ofﬁcials and tax
departments ﬁled a tax plea on
Vodafone regarding capital gains
taxes on the Hutchison acquisition.
Albeit, during 2007e2012,
Vodafone attended to and
answered all tax allegations at
both the state-level high court and
the apex court of the country. We
suggest that Vodafone acquired
signiﬁcant ownership rights, saved
corporate gains taxes of
approximately INR 20,000 crore,
and ﬁnally succeeded over the tax
plea because of better bargaining
power (gained through previous
international acquisition
experience).
We argue that improvements in
the bargaining power of the
acquiring ﬁrm are directly
proportional to its prior deal-
making experience. Because it had
no international outlook and no
acquisition experience, Bharti
Airtel failed to materialize the deal
with the MTN Group. We also
understand that both companies
had a simply developed deal
structure without lasting goals
towards bargaining during deal
making. If they had bargained
better in the second inning, the
deal structure (e.g. ownership
control, payment mode, stock
options) would have been
changed, resulting in a successful
deal. Arguably, ‘the more the
bargaining (not lengthy or
unfruitful discussions) in deal
making, the more the chances of
deal completion’. In fact,
bargaining power determines the
business valuation of a target.
In addition to no prior experience
in the oil exploration business,
Vedanta acquired signiﬁcant
ownership rights in Cairn India
Ltd. Hence, we do not comment on
the valuation of the assets or
shares of the target ﬁrm. From the
lens of bargaining power theory,
we suggest that Vedanta will
acquire new experience in the oil
business, gain management
expertise, and improve its
diversiﬁed business value. In
particular, Vedanta owns Cairn
Energy's stake given its prior
acquisition experience and
location advantage, combined
with an on-going business in India.
Therefore, we argue that the better
bargaining power of the acquiring
ﬁrm could make a deal happen in
an unrelated business. In fact,
Vedanta received all government
approvals because of its good
negations, transaction handling,
and location experience.
Information asymmetry
theory (Akerlof, 1970;
Spence, 1973)
A ﬁrm with better information
about the target ﬁrm and host
country government experiences
success in cross-border acquisition
negotiations.
Vodafone (perhaps its M&A
advisors) has better information
on the Indian legal framework
than government ofﬁcials
(revenue department and tax
authorities). This information
helps Vodafone win
counterarguments and penalties
put forward by tax ofﬁcials. Finally,
the Supreme Court of India
delivered its judgement in favour
of Vodafone by stating that the
‘existing book of law does not
From the lens of the information
asymmetry theory, we argue that
neither Bharti Airtel nor the MTN
Group had adequate information
about deal making and the
external determinants of an
overseas deal. In fact, the M&A
advisors failed to understand the
existing laws related to foreign
deals, dual listings, and other
factors. If they had known these
institutional difﬁculties prior to
the ﬁrst inning (or before
We strongly argue that because of
the ‘newness’ to the oil and gas
exploration business, the Vedanta
eCairn India deal was delayed but
later completed after obtaining
government approvals. Herewith,
newness refers to the business but
not to the location. In the given
case, either Vedanta or Cairn
Energy has better information on
deal completion mechanisms in
India. In fact, both ﬁrms faced
severe approval issues related to
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allow tax authorities to ask or
impose the capital gains tax on
VodafoneeHutchison deal’. In fact,
Vodafone experienced many
difﬁculties for entering a foreign
market in an unethical and drama-
oriented politician nation. We
believe this information can assist
Vodafone in future decision
making when staying or engaging
in operations for Indian
consumers.
commencing the second inning),
the deal would have been
completed within the period set by
the companies. In another
instance, the M&A advisors could
have developed alternative deal
structures to satisfy the merging
parties and to meet the
institutional requirements without
political intervention. This
outcome supports the notion that
the merging parties had no
expertise in or understanding of
the regulatory hurdles or
information on overseas deals.
open offers programmes with the
Security Exchange Board of India,
and production sharing contracts
with the Ministry of Petroleum.
We also suggest thatM&A advisors
have no prior experience in the oil
industry, particularly in India. Both
newness and no prior experience
in oil exploration created
information asymmetry problems
that adversely affected the
completion of the deal.
Agency theory (Jensen
and Meckling, 1976)
Acquiring ﬁrm managers
participate in acquisitions and
attempt to buy other companies at
the expense of target shareholders
(expenses are higher at higher
valuation levels, leading to the
destruction of shareholder funds).
According to agency theory,
managers are assumed not to
perform in a timely manner and
exploit shareholders' funds. This
theory partially explains some of
the issues involved in our case. For
example, managers and M&A
advisory ﬁrms could have gained
signiﬁcant incentives from this
deal, which were paid by Vodafone
and Hutchison. On the one hand,
Vodafone entered a potential
market and, thus, paid a massive
amount in the form of a premium.
On the other hand, HWL recovered
from its existing loss position. For
instance, Whalley and Curwen
(2012) argued that HTIL could
have represented a loss in 2007
with no sale of its 100% equity
interest in the Cayman Islands-
based CGP Investments (Holdings)
Limited to Vodafone. It is worth
mentioning that HTIL has invested
roughly US$2.6 billion in India
since 1995. In this regard, one can
estimate that Li Ka-shing has
outstandingly gained about US$8.3
billion for the period stayed in
India (1995e2006).
Given the consistency of the
agency theory construct, we argue
that managers of both Bharti Airtel
and MTN Group were found to be
expensive at the cost of
shareholder funds. One strong
reason is that both companies
spent signiﬁcant amounts on the
deal, such as on the M&A advisory
fee, application fee, and other fees
related to deal logistics. If
managers could have been
proactive in understanding the
regulatory hurdles, both
companies would have saved
signiﬁcant transaction costs. Given
this effect, shareholders
experienced negative returns
around two successive talks, but
gained after the deal was
unsuccessful. Thus, the transaction
cost adversely affected accounting
performance through the sunk
costs related to deal making.
From the lens of agency theory, we
argue that acquiring ﬁrm
managers did not exploit
shareholders' funds. On the one
hand, because of its newness to the
oil business, Vedanta's managers
strove to seek approvals from the
concerned government
departments. On the other hand,
M&A advisors seem to have
exploited Vedanta's funds in terms
of charging a higher deal fee and
due diligence expenses. For two
reasons, the deal was delayed and
later completed because of the
location advantage of Vedanta,
which was an Indian-origin
diversiﬁed business group. Thus, a
time delay proportionately
increases the transaction costs
incurred in the deal (other than
deal value), which adversely
affects the acquiring ﬁrm's
ﬁnancial earnings in that year.
Institutional theory
(Selznick, 1948; Meyer
and Rowan, 1977;
Zucker, 1987; North,
1990; Scott, 1995; Peng
et al., 2008)
A country's formal institutional
rules, regulations, laws, guidelines,
conduct, and political
environment, and other
constitutional factors, signiﬁcantly
affect businesses in that country
(the inﬂuence is greater in
international trade and
investment decisions given the
institutional distance between
host and home country).
This theory fairly supports the case
study observations. When testing
this theory, most previous studies
do not reveal the conclusions or
ﬁndings at the foreign market
entry level, particularly cross-
border acquisitions. In fact,
previous scholars investigated the
given sample from the ‘ﬁrm's
viewpoint’ and not the ‘nation's
perspective’. On the one hand, we
agree that the Indian institutional
framework is rigid, complex,
controversial, and reﬂective of
frustrated bureaucratic capital and
unethical political behaviour, and
no accountability or responsibility.
However, this theory does not
explain whether such institutional
behaviour affects the given
economy's ﬁscal revenue or
budget.
Economic, ﬁnancial, regulatory,
and socio-cultural factors were
found to determine the success of
merger negotiations, particularly
in overseas M&As. In the given
case, we argue that the deal was
unsuccessful because of regulatory
hurdles (e.g. dual listing, open
offers programme), the erratic
behaviour of government
authorities (e.g. telecom
regulatory), and political
intervention for personal beneﬁt
(e.g. various ministries and
secretaries). Therefore, we suggest
that institutional determinants
play a key role in overseas deal
completion. On the other hand,
cultural issues between India and
South Africa, and incompatible
national strategies between Bharti
Airtel and MTN might also explain
the causes behind the broken
overseas telecom deal.
Researchers in sociology suggested
that institutions deﬁne rules,
regulations, procedures, and
norms that are required for a good
economy. At the same time,
institutions that include
government, political, justice, and
cultural groups inﬂuence both
economic and non-economic
activities. In the given case, the
VedantaeCairn India deal was
delayed because of institutional
dichotomous problems (e.g. open
offers in the view of cross-
ownership), erratic behaviour of
government ofﬁcials, and ruling
political party intervention. Hence,
we posit that the culture between
India and the United Kingdom
affected the deal. This case
provides support for the
institutional theory construct that
institutions, such as government
and political groups, inﬂuence
business transactions both
domestically and overseas.
Liability of foreignness
eLOF (Caves, 1971;
Hymer, 1976;
A bidding ﬁrm participating in
international acquisitions
experiences information
Unfortunately, most LOF studies
examined or investigated MNCs
and their subsidiaries'
Liability of foreignness is a crucial
factor to be studied by corporate
professionals when making
From the lens of the liability of
foreignness, we ﬁnd no coexisting
case proof to support the
(continued on next page)
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DiMaggio and Powell,
1983; Zaheer, 1995;
Cuervo-Cazurra et al.,
2007)
asymmetry induced by knowledge
spillover and higher levels of
transaction costs attributable to
the foreignness from being new to
the host country.
performance during the post-
entrance or post-setup of units in a
given economy and compared
those results with local ﬁrms.
Unlike these studies, this case
provides legitimate evidence at
the foreign market entry level,
particularly in developing
economies. Thus, India's frustrated
and rigid regulatory behaviour and
tax framework are the root causes
behind the world's long time
delayed cross-country
acquisitions. To support this
statement, we present the time
line of the deal. Vodafone faced
various government allegations in
two jurisdictions, namely the
Bombay high court (a state-level
jurisdiction) and the supreme
court (apex court of a given
country). During these ﬁve years
(2007e2011), Vodafone possibly
spent at least 2% of the deal
amount, which is an additional
transaction cost to the company.
Company operations cannot be
focused on and top-level
management must answer various
queries raised by the directors in
board meetings. Indeed, this issue
again creates controversies within
the board; however, the company
managed well in a given situation.
foreign investments, particularly
in developing countries. Thus, we
support the concept that the deal
was called off in the second inning
because of the underestimation of
the foreignness problems related
to regulatory issues and ruling
political party intervention.
Further, transaction costs
associated with deal making
become sunk recorded expenses
that adversely affect accounting
earnings. This streak also infers
that deal transaction costs increase
because of foreignness issues in
the given host country. However,
we believe that MTN spent a
signiﬁcant amount on deal making
given the LOF problems in the host
country of India. The existing
theory largely supports MNEs'
operating strategies in host
countries but not during pre-
merger negotiations. The LOF
theory is understood as being
partially supported by the case
evidence.
theoretical construct. Hence, we
argue that because of its ‘newness’
to the oil exploration business,
Vedanta strove to face foreignness
problems in deal making but not in
the location. Moreover, Cairn
Energy also experienced
foreignness problems related to
production sharing contracts with
its joint venture partner ONGC and
other government approvals. If
Vedanta had prior experience in
the oil business, the deal would
have completed within the period
with all necessary government
approvals. Thereafter, it could have
focused on post-acquisition
integration strategies that
signiﬁcantly reduce the
transaction costs of a deal in terms
of deal logistics and advisory fees.
In sum, no signiﬁcant LOF
problems were related to the deal.
Market efﬁciency theory
(Fama et al., 1969;
Fama, 1970)
Capital markets react to new
information; for example, stock
prices fully reﬂect available
information, and the reﬂection
appears in weak, semi-strong, and
strong market efﬁciency.
Deal announcement:
Vodafone shareholders received
signiﬁcant higher returns of
approximately 1.34% on
announcement day. Therefore, the
change in stock prices was the
result of new information that
addresses the acquisition decision,
which eventually supports the
‘semi-strong’ theory.
Vodafone won the tax plea case:
The stock price declined by 2.51%
after the immediate day (win over
the tax plea case). Hence, we argue
that a decline in the stock price
does not explain this reason. The
reﬂection was sufﬁcient to explain
market efﬁciency.
First inning: Bharti Airtel's stock
price declined by 5.32% on the
announcement day because of
cross-border merger negotiations.
Second inning: Bharti Airtel's stock
price again crashed by 4.83% on
the announcement day;
shareholders were unhappy with
managerial decisions.
Deal cancellation: Bharti Airtel's
stock price increased by 3.90% on
the day after the announcement of
unsuccessful negotiations with
MTN.
Therefore, we suggest that Bharti
Airtel's stock price fully reﬂects
information because of the new
information that resulted in
market efﬁciency that was a
‘strong thread’.
Vedanta Resources and Cairn
Energy shareholders experienced
signiﬁcant higher returns on
announcement day (4.87%, 5.32%),
whereas Cairn India's stock price
declined by 6.36%.
Thus, we suggest that new
information (acquisition
announcement by Vedanta)
resulted in signiﬁcant stock price
returns, which supports the
‘strong’ thread of market
efﬁciency.
Notes: In our previous work (Reddy et al., 2014a), we fairly tested six theories, including FDI theory, the eclectic framework, Uppsala theory, LOF, institutional theory, and
information asymmetry, for only one case e the VodafoneeHutchison deal (pp. 66e67). Relevant observations were reproduced for greater clarity of presentation and were
eventually improved on in this paper. Our intention is to bring attention to the overall view of the three sample cases.
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litical, and social) affects the likelihood of completing an overseas
deal. These constructs are propounded as the ‘Farmers Fox theory’,
which postulates:
‘a given country's weak (loopholes in) ﬁnancial and tax regula-
tory system beneﬁts both the acquirer and the target ﬁrm in
cross-border acquisitions based on two assumptions: ﬁrst, one
must have some experience within the given economic and
regulatory environment or some kind of alliance with a local
ﬁrm; second, the other one should be new to the economy where
the target ﬁrm is registered or associated. In the given situation,this economic behaviour adversely affects that country's ﬁscal
income or revenue’.
In other words, a country that characterizes weak institutional
laws, a high level of corruption, severe politicking (ruling political
party intervention), hosting foreign direct investments, or inviting
foreign MNCs through the acquisition method may have to the
record a loss of economic incentives such as international taxes,
cross-listing fees, and taxes on overseas revenues. In that case, the
acquirer and/or target should enjoy such economic beneﬁts
without paying for them to the sovereign of the host country e
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target, or both). In fact, the economic loss will be higher if the
acquirer or target ﬁrm is associated with a developed country.
However, a few limitations need to be checked before testing this
theory in future research (refer to Reddy et al., 2014a:61e62).5.1. Building testable propositions
We suggest testable propositions for further research in the
cross-borderM&A stream of emergingmarkets, whichwill advance
the current knowledge on foreign acquisitions when researchers
empirically test a large sample. The constructs are being developed
on the basis of the research argument that overseas inbound in-
vestment deals in the form of acquisitions or mergers are delayed,
and then become successes or failures for two important reasons
that reﬂect the responsibility of the host country: (i) erratic
behaviour of the sovereign (government ofﬁcials, ruling political
party) and (ii) weak institutional laws related to ﬁnancial markets
and taxation. Following this streak, the proposed theory posits that
the acquirer or target ﬁrm enjoys economic beneﬁts whilst the host
country government experiences an economic loss resulting from
supposedly lawful revenue.
On the basis of the understanding and research experience, we
seek to present a weak regulatory system, along with evidence of
the responsibility of international organizations, including the
World Bank, the World Economic Forum, The Heritage Foundation,
and Transparency International, to cite a few. In this vein, Lucas
(1990) also postulated that developing countries characterize a
poor economy and do not have sound institutional laws related to
investor protection, intellectual property rights, ownership pat-
terns, listing procedures, and so forth of legal, administrative, and
policy implementation issues. In addition, some scholars argued
that developing economies (so-called emerging markets) do not
have sophisticated laws for anti-corruption, crime, social welfare,
judgement delivery, and others. Several economic and law scholars
suggested that corruption is one of the major economic barriers
that adversely affects the economic development of a country,
reﬂecting actions such as wasteful government spending and
discouraging foreign inward investments (Tanzi and Davoodi,
1998).
According to the Transparency International2-CPI report-2011,
Russia was the most corrupt country (2.4) among the BRIC group,
followed by India (3.1), China (3.6), and Brazil (3.8). In particular,
the degree of corruption in India has declined in terms of CPI, from
2.7 in 2001 to 3.1 in 2011. The World Economic Forum (WEF)
deﬁned ﬁnancial development in its Financial Development Report
(WEF-FDR, 2012) ‘as the factors, policies, and institutions that lead
to effective ﬁnancial intermediation and markets, as well as deep
and broad access to capital and ﬁnancial services’ (p. xiii). Financial
development is measured using factors such as size, depth, access,
and the efﬁciency and stability of a ﬁnancial system, which includes
its markets, intermediaries, range of assets, institutions, and regu-
lations (p. 4). The report was developed on the seven pillars of
institutional environment, business environment, ﬁnancial stabil-
ity, banking ﬁnancial services, non-banking ﬁnancial services,
ﬁnancial markets, and ﬁnancial access. In this paper, the institu-
tional environment refers to ﬁnancial sector liberalization, corpo-
rate governance, legal and regulatory issues, and contract2 TI is an international nongovernment organization set up in the 1990s and
headquartered in Berlin that has aimed to report the corruption perception index
(CPI) for world economies since 1995. The CPI has been developed each year on the
scale of 0e10, where 0 refers to the highest measure of corruption and 10 refers to
the lowest (source: http://www.transparency.org).enforcement. The rank for India based on the Financial Develop-
ment Index was 40 in 2012, up from 36 in 2011. The change in rank
for other BRIC economies was Brazil (32 from 30), China (23 from
19), and Russia (39). These results indicate that a lower rank infers
more development. For example, Hong Kong secured the ﬁrst rank,
followed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and so forth. In
terms of institutional environment, India placed 56 compared with
Brazil (46), China (35), and Russia (59). In particular, the Heritage
Foundation (THF) publishes the Index of Economic Freedom, which
included a sample of 184 countries for its 2012 report (THF andWSJ,
2012). The objective of the index is ‘to evaluate the rule of law, the
intrusiveness of government, regulatory efﬁciency, and the open-
ness of markets’. The grades and ranks are usually based on 10
pillars of freedom, such as Property Rights, Freedom from Corrup-
tion, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Business Freedom,
Labour Freedom, Monetary Freedom, Trade Freedom, Investment
Freedom, and Financial Freedom. India was ranked 123, Brazil 99,
China 138, and Russia 144.
An ofﬁcial reference of the Doing Business 2012/2013 Report, a
co-publication of The World Bank and the International Finance
Corporation, presented quantitative indicators on the business
environment and regulations for 185 countries (The World Bank
and IFC, 2012, 2013). The report computes an index value on the
basis of 11 topics, such as starting a business, dealing with con-
struction permits, getting electricity, registering property, getting
credit, protecting investors, paying taxes, trading across borders,
enforcing contracts, resolving insolvency, and employing workers.
The given economy, India, was found to be in the lower middle-
income category and its rank for ease of doing business fairly
improved by seven points, from 139 in 2011 to 132 in 2012 and
2013. Brazil went from 126 to 130, China remained at 91, and Russia
went from 120 to 112. Other indicators for India during 2012e2013
are as follows: starting a business (166e173), dealing with con-
struction permits (181e182), obtaining electricity (98e105), regis-
tering property (97e94), obtaining credit (40e23), protecting
investors (46e49), paying taxes (147e152), trading across borders
(109e127), enforcing contracts (182e184), and resolving insol-
vency (128e116). For instance, to enforce a contract, one should
wait at least 1420 days in India compared with Brazil at 731 days,
China at 406 days, and Russia at 281 days, decreasing to 270 days
and obtaining approval from 46 departments (procedures). Further,
India ranked 166–173 for starting a business, relative to Brazil
(120e121), China (151), and Russia (111e101).
The World Economic Forum also publishes the Global Compet-
itiveness Report every year, in which it deﬁned competitiveness as
the set of institutions, policies, and factors that determine a coun-
try's productivity level. The Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) is
computed on the basis of 12 pillars of competitiveness: institutions,
infrastructure, macroeconomic environment, health and primary
education, higher education and training, goods market efﬁciency,
labour market efﬁciency, ﬁnancial market development, techno-
logical readiness, market size, business sophistication, and inno-
vation. For the 2013e14 Global Competitiveness Report (WEF-GCR,
2013), India was found to be one of the 38 factor-driven economies
in that group (the other two groups were efﬁciency-driven and
innovation-driven). In a sample of 148 countries, India ranked 60
for competitiveness, whereas Brazil was 56, China was 29, and
Russia was 64. In the case of institutions, macroeconomic envi-
ronment, and ﬁnancial market development, India ranked 72, 110,
and 19 compared with Brazil at 80, 75, and 50, China at 47, 10, and
54, and Russia at 121, 19, and 121.
These indicators suggest that India fairly improved its economic
performance but was seriously affected by a weak institutional
framework, including higher levels of corruption and political
intervention. Therefore, the major theoretical foundation is that ‘in
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in line with a similar group of countries, or fails to amend speciﬁc
rules and guidelines for a public good, and when a system is highly
corrupted by the known political instability and bureaucrats in-
efﬁciency, together leads to delay or break both public and
business-purpose legal procedures e is described as weak regula-
tory system’; and this institutional dichotomy attribute adversely
affects government ﬁscal income whilst beneﬁtting other stake-
holders (as mentioned in Reddy et al., 2014a:62).
Herewith, the propositions are redeﬁned as follows. Firstly, we
derive a few insights into the behaviour of the ruling political party
and ministries in service during the announcement of cross-border
inbound acquisitions. The service ministries and ruling political
party ofﬁcials interfered in two out of the three cases (Bharti Air-
teleMTN and VedantaeCairn India). These entities were also noted
as typically interfering if an overseas inbound acquisition is char-
acterized by a high bid value and cash payment. In fact, the inter-
vention is stronger if a deal has a higher valuation, cash payment,
an acquiring ﬁrm from a developed country, and is in an industry
largely accounted for by government-owned companies. Of central
note is that many industries in India are controlled by public-sector
undertakings, such as oil, gas, petroleum, power, railways, tele-
communications, and so forth. Further, ownership in public and
private limited companies is primarily held by family members. We
ﬁnd that the Bharti AirteleMTN deal was valued at approximately
US$23 billion and the VedantaeCairn India deal was valued at
approximately US$8.67 billion. While supporting the politicking
attribute, the Chairman of Bharti Airtel and top-level managers of
MTN entered into negotiations with ruling political party ofﬁcials,
the telecom ministry, and other bureaucratic administrators. The
Chairman of Vedanta Resources also met ofﬁcials who have control
over government approval issues related to the Cairn India deal.
The common ﬁnding is that all three deals were larger in terms of
deal value, which inﬂuenced the ruling party politicians to seek
self-beneﬁt (e.g. corruption). Given this consistency, we put for-
ward a proposition for encouraging research on the market for
overseas investments and acquisitions around the political uncer-
tainty related to the host country's domestic elections.
Proposition 1.1. The host country's ruling political party and
respected service ministries interfere in foreign inward acquisitions
or investments that characterize a high bid value and a cash
payment.
Proposition 1.2. The host country's ruling political party's and
respected service ministries' intervention is ‘more active’ in foreign
inward acquisitions or investments ﬂowing from developed coun-
tries and that are characterized by a high bid value and a cash
payment.
Proposition 1.3. The host country's ruling political party's and
respected service ministries' intervention is ‘more active’ in foreign
inward acquisitions or investments characterized by a high bid
value if that industry is largely controlled by government-owned or
public-sector enterprises.
In addition to the interference by the ruling political party and
respected serviceministries, the behaviour of a given host country's
government ofﬁcials and respected service institutions also in-
ﬂuences the completion of the deal. In any country, the common
practice is for government ofﬁcials (e.g. department of revenue,
central board of direct taxes) and regulatory authorities to receive
applications regarding overseas investments; therefore, they are
responsible for inspecting and approving such proposals. Interest-
ingly, the erratic behaviour of regulatory agencies and govern-
mental ofﬁcials was injected into all three deals. For example, theVodafoneeHutchison deal was litigated for approximately ﬁve
years, after which Vodafone ﬁnally won the tax plea case in the
apex court. Conversely, the VedantaeCairn India deal was delayed
because of the open offers programme under the SEBI's takeover
code and Cairn Energy's production sharing contract with the
public-sector undertaking of ONGC (of course, royalty payments).
The deal was ﬁnally completed 16 months after the announcement
of the acquisition. Further, institutional ofﬁcers intermittently
interfere in overseas inward acquisitions featuring higher bid
values and cash payments. This interference is stronger if an
acquirer belongs to a developed country and the industry is pri-
marily controlled by public-sector undertakings. Following this, we
develop a proposition to initiate new research on institutional
distance (e.g. working culture among government departments)
around overseas acquisition announcements.
Proposition 2.1. The host country's government ofﬁcials and
respected service institutions show erratic behaviour in foreign
inward acquisitions or investments that are characterized by high
bid value and cash payments.
Proposition 2.2. The host country's government ofﬁcials and
respected service institutions' erratic behaviour is ‘more’ in foreign
inward acquisitions or investments ﬂowing from developed coun-
tries that are characterized by high bid value and cash payments.
Proposition 2.3. The host country's government ofﬁcials and
respected service institutions' erratic behaviour will be ‘more’ in
foreign inward acquisitions or investments characterized by a high
bid value if that industry is largely controlled by government-
owned or public-sector enterprises.
Using these constructs, we argue that border-crossing inward
deals usually take more time compared with the actual time
required to obtain government approvals. In other words, deals
featuring higher valuations are delayed because of improper laws
(e.g. cross-listing, open offers, ownership rights, investor protec-
tion, accounting standards). In effect, the inconsistent behaviour of
government ofﬁcials affects such deals. In some instances, such
deals need more time to obtain sovereign approval when the in-
vestment is from a developed country. This situation is true in this
case research. For instance, Bharti Airtel andMTNGroup could have
created a consolidated entity if the Indian government has a legal
update on dual listings or cross listings. Realistically, no govern-
ment wants to lose its control on any business or trade. Hence, the
Indian government deregulated many industrial policies and,
thereby, disinvested a signiﬁcant number of public sector un-
dertakings. For example, Vedanta acquired full control of Bharat
Aluminium Company Limited, which was a loss-making unit that
turned into a proﬁt-making unit after a few years of integration. In
this vein, we notice an interesting ﬁnding e an overseas deal
characterized by a higher bid value and cash payments is delayed if
that business is largely proclaimed by government enterprises.
However, such deals require more time when an acquirer comes
from a developed country. Further, the VodafoneeHutchison and
VedantaeCairn India deals (including legal issues) were severely
delayed, and then became successes because both acquiring ﬁrms
were registered in the United Kingdom, the advanced country. As
such, VodafoneeHutchison was one of the worst time-delayed
cross-country deals in the world economy. The deal was initiated
in December 2006, announced to the media in February 2007, and
completed in May 2007. Tax authorities ﬁled a petition in the given
country's state jurisdiction […] and, ﬁnally, the Supreme Court of
India provided a judgement in January 2012. In sum, for Vodafone,
the transaction consumed approximately 62 months. In contrast,
Bharti Airtel wanted to merge with South African-based MTN
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of negotiations (2008e2009) because of regulatory hurdles that
were largely controlled by the SEBI and the Ministry of Finance. For
instance, the hurdles refer to dual listing norms and complex deal
structures involving open offers. The reality of the case is as follows:
‘the given country's regulatory system does not deﬁne what a dual
listing is’. With such insightful evidence, we suggest a set of con-
structs to investigate ‘deal announcement to deal completion
(number of days)’ between domestic and overseas acquisitions in
developed and developing nations.
Proposition 3.1. Cross-border inward acquisitions (time required
to obtain approval from the government) become delayed, and
then are completed or broken because of weak institutional laws
related to investor protection, cross-listings and intellectual prop-
erty rights, and institutional ofﬁcials' erratic behaviour, if such deals
are characterized by higher valuations.
Proposition 3.2. Cross-border inward acquisitions require more
time to obtain approvals from necessary government departments,
causing delays in such deals. If such deals are characterized by high
bid value and the investment is from a developed country, the they
are completed or broken because of weak institutional laws related
to investor protection, cross-listings and intellectual property
rights, and institutional ofﬁcials' erratic behaviour.
Proposition 3.3. Cross-border inward acquisitions characterized
by higher bid values and that are in an industry largely controlled
by government-owned ﬁrms (time required to obtain approval
from the government) become delayed, and then are completed or
broken because of weak institutional laws related to investor pro-
tection, cross-listings and intellectual property rights, and institu-
tional ofﬁcials' erratic behaviour.
Proposition 3.4. Cross-border inward acquisitions characterized
by a high bid value, an investment from a developed country, and in
an industry largely controlled by government-owned enterprises
require more time to obtain approvals from necessary government
departments, causing delays in such deals, which are then
completed or broken because of weak institutional laws related to
investor protection, cross-listings and intellectual property rights,
and institutional ofﬁcials' erratic behaviour.
Following the previous argument, we explain the behaviour of
acquisition costs attributable to delays in deals being completed or
that are unsuccessful. Acquiring a publicly listed ﬁrm results in
higher acquisition costs than when acquiring a privately held ﬁrm.
Indeed, acquiring a ﬁrm in a foreign country also results in signif-
icant higher costs (e.g. border taxes, legal fee, registration fee,
advisory fee, corporate gains taxes) compared with the costs
involved in domestic deals. From a practical sense, the acquiring
ﬁrm is responsible for bearing a signiﬁcant portion of the acquisi-
tion costs that range between 2% and 5% of the deal value. Of
course, this cost is directly associated with the deal completion
process related to the time required to obtain government
approval. In other words, the acquiring ﬁrm must bear all trans-
action costs until it obtains approval from government authorities,
such as the high court, the relevant ministry (e.g. telecom), and
regulatory bodies (e.g. SEBI, CCI). Therefore, acquisition costs in-
crease when a deal is delayed or unsuccessful because of the weak
laws related to securities markets and investor protection, and the
inconsistent behaviour of sovereign departments, assuming higher
valuations and cash payments. In some instances, acquiring ﬁrms
must allocate more funds for acquisitions when an investment is
from a developed country and the industry is largely controlled by
government ﬁrms. Although we support this streak, we acknowl-
edge that Vodafone incurred signiﬁcant costs, such as communicationcosts, legal proceedings costs, and other associated costs, during
2007e2012 because of the delay in receiving a judgement.
Conversely, both Bharti Airtel and MTN Group spent signiﬁcant
funds during two innings; however, such expenses had to be
recorded as ‘sunk costs’ given the unsuccessful negotiations.
Therefore, we recommend a proposition for initiating further
investigation into transaction costs around delayed, successful, and
incomplete deals between domestic and overseas entities.
Proposition 4.1. If deals are characterized by high bid values,
acquiring ﬁrms' acquisition costs increase in proportion to the deal
completion process (time required to obtain government ap-
provals) given weak institutional laws related to investor protec-
tion, cross-listings, intellectual property rights, and institutional
ofﬁcials' erratic behaviour.
Proposition 4.2. Acquiring ﬁrms' acquisition costs are ‘more’
(more than the proportion of the deal completion process) given
weak institutional laws related to investor protection, cross-
listings, intellectual property rights, and institutional ofﬁcials'
erratic behaviour, if the deals are characterized by high bid values,
investments are from developed countries, and the industry is
largely controlled by public sector enterprises.
Finally, we reach the focal point e how do unsuccessful deals
affect the given host country's revenue or income? Extant studies
suggested that an international direct investment from a developed
economy largely beneﬁts the host country's economy in terms of
incentives such as new capital creation, industrial development,
new job creation, the supply of goods, better utilization of re-
sources, enhanced skills and expertise, transfer of technology and
revenue to the sovereign, and so forth. At the same time, such an
investment adversely affects market conditions, the pricing of
goods and services, competition, the survival of local ﬁrms, and
other uncertainties. On the basis of multiple case research, we
argue that a country that invites foreign investment (FDI or the
acquisition route) loses economic beneﬁts such as taxes on reve-
nues, border taxes, capital gains taxes on cash deals, and non-
economic beneﬁts including technology transfers when the num-
ber of incomplete deals or withdrawals increases because of weak
institutional laws, politicking, and the irrational behaviour of gov-
ernment ofﬁcials. In other words, an increase in the number of
incomplete deals adversely affects the ﬁscal revenue of the country
inviting foreign investments. Furthermore, the economic loss is
high if an acquisition is characterized by a higher valuation, cash
payment, an acquirer from a developed nation, and an industry that
is largely directed by state-owned enterprises. Vodafone beneﬁtted
from avoiding a capital gains tax through a landmark judgement by
India's apex court, which stated that existing tax guidelines do not
allow tax authorities to impose capital gains taxes on Vodafone in
the VodafoneeHutchison deal. As a result, Vodafone beneﬁted by
approximately 20% of the given deal amount (US$10.9 billion), or
US$2.18 billion. By and large, Hutchison-Whampoa Limited (HWL)
also beneﬁted from the premium value that Vodafone paid. In re-
ality, HWL had invested approximately US$2.6 billion in India since
1995 and sold to Vodafone for US$10.9 billion, for a beneﬁt of
US$8.3 billion, per se. In the paradigm of international laws, only an
acquiring ﬁrm is liable for paying taxes and not the target ﬁrm. In
sum, both acquirer and target beneﬁted because of loopholes in the
given country's institutional setting. In contrast, the sovereign
might have lost ﬁscal revenue in the form of corporate taxes, listing
fees, cross-listing fees, and border taxes because of the unsuccessful
Bharti AirteleMTN Group transaction. Both cases were found to be
true given weak laws related to securities markets, investor pro-
tection, and border taxes. In addition to losing capital inﬂows into
India, capital ﬂowed outward when Bharti Airtel acquired Kuwait-
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constructive arguments, we recommend a proposition for
improving the current knowledge on ‘nationalism and institutional
dichotomy’ in cross-border inbound investments.
Proposition 5.1. A country's sovereign expected revenue declines
in proportion to an increase in the number of unsuccessful inter-
national deals.
Proposition 5.2. A country's sovereign expected revenue declines
‘more’ than the proportional increase in the number of unsuc-
cessful international deals, if such deals are characterized by high
bid value, cash payment, an investment ﬂowing from developed
countries, and an industry largely controlled by public-sector
enterprises.
Proposition 5.3. The acquirer and/or target ﬁrm beneﬁts (e.g.
from undervaluation of domestic ﬁrms, capital gains taxes on cash
acquisitions) in cross-border inbound acquisitions because of a host
country's weak ﬁnancial markets and tax regulatory environment.
In addition, this construct is strengthened if future scholars
undertake the composite proposition put forwarded by Reis et al.
(2013): ‘A greater difference between acquirer and target nations’
(i) economic institutions; (ii) political distance; and (iii) social in-
stitutions ‘(a) reduces the likelihood of completing an announced
M&A deal and (b) lengthens the period from announcement to
completion/withdrawal of the M&A deal’.
Lastly, we propose that developed country-based ﬁrms, such as
Vodafone, Vedanta, and Cairn Energy, acquired good knowledge on
the given country's constitutional system, weaknesses in the reg-
ulatory setting, tactics for approaching public administration au-
thorities and bureaucrats, relations among politicians, bureaucrats,
industry associations, jurisdictions, media, and the public, and the
market potential for its survival. Thus, acquiring a ﬁrm in a devel-
oping country such as India is a learning experience for developed
country MNCs when engaging in future deals in that country or
other nations. Researchers in IB, strategy, ﬁnance, accounting, and
economics are advised to test these theoretical propositions, which
advance the understanding of the theory.
In sum, we propose a new theory that addresses the impact of
the institutional environment on cross-border M&A completion.
The theory explains how a given country's weak institutional and
legal framework and political intervention adversely result in deal
completion for deals with higher valuations, cash payments,
acquiring ﬁrms from developed countries, and in industries largely
controlled by the host country's government. Hence, such institu-
tional dichotomous attributes beneﬁt the acquirer, the target, or
both, whereas the host country's government loses the economic
beneﬁts of international investments.6. Concluding remarks
This section concludes the research and presents the learning
from the research, highlights, limitations, and a closing note.
On the one hand, the learning from this multiple case research is
as follows. (i) Tax, taxation, and tax exemption attributes signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuence the completion of overseas acquisitions. This in-
ﬂuence is stronger when deals are characterized by higher
valuation levels, cash payments, and industries largely controlled
by government undertaking ﬁrms of that host country. Certainly,
this inﬂuence was evidenced by the host country government's
loose economic beneﬁt (capital gains tax) from weak institutional
policies that covered tax provisions. (ii) Overseas acquisitions were
often delayed and/or unsuccessful because of strict/weak ﬁnancial
markets and regulations that addressed open offers programmes,takeover guidelines, dual listings, and ownership rights. (iii) Polit-
ical intervention and the erratic behaviour of a bureaucratic
administration adversely affected the completion of cross-border
acquisitions. Indeed, the pressure was stronger for deals marked
by higher valuations, cash payments, and industries largely
controlled by public-sector ﬁrms of that host country. (iv) We
tested the extant theories in various management-related disci-
plines and, thereby, proposed new theories/testable propositions
that together improved the understanding of the role of institu-
tional distance in the success of cross-border acquisitions.
On the other hand, the major highlights of this study are as
follows. (a) A signiﬁcant number of Indian-based multinationals
made investments in other countries because of home country
institutional constrains. This streak supports the empirical analysis
in which ‘ﬁrms invest outside the country as an escape response to
home country rigid laws and less investor protection’ (Witt and
Lewin, 2007). Indian companies selected countries with better
legal systems, advanced accounting standards, strong investor
protection, or similar legal quality and standards. (b) Incompatible
strategies, national governance structures, culture clashes, and
lengthy negotiations together led to broken or delayed deals that
inﬂuenced the deal value and increased transaction costs for the
acquirer. (c) Cross-border deals characterized by higher valuations,
cash payments, target listed ﬁrms, and industries largely controlled
by government enterprises were found to be delayed, litigated by
government inﬂuence and ruling political party pressure, and faced
erratic behaviour of institutional authorities, which created greater
public attention through the print and electronic media. (d) The
liability of foreignness and the liability of localness were found to
be severe in Indian-hosted deals characterized by higher valuations
and cash payments. (e) A given country's weak regulatory system
(ﬁnancial markets regulations, tax environment) beneﬁts bidding
ﬁrms, target ﬁrms, or both; in unison, this economic behaviour
adversely affects a host country's ﬁscal income.
Yet, this research was carried out with limitations. The central
limitations of the research are data reliability and data trans-
ferability. For these two reasons, (a) a signiﬁcant proportion of the
data was collected from registered ﬁnance dailies and (b) no
qualitative research software was used to analyse the sample cases.
Albeit, we carefully recorded the case events, arranged them in
chronological order, and systematically analysed them in a retro-
spective manner. Therefore, we admit the jeopardy that cross-case
analysis discussions might be inclined by inaccurate memories,
personal bias (Choi and Brommels, 2009), and sampling time. Thus,
the proposed theory and propositions motivate researchers to
engage in similar investigations in other institutional settings. Last
but not least, what are the dramatic macroeconomic changes
noticed in both developed and emerging economies around the
recent global ﬁnancial crisis and their impact on overseas in-
vestments and acquisitions? Moreover, do successful and unsuc-
cessful cross-border acquisitions produce similar shareholder
earnings around the announcement that require further research?
Altogether, additional research is needed on pre-merger and post-
merger integration phases in cross-border acquisitions between
developed and emerging markets.
The closing note of this case research puts forward the notion
that qualitative research takes much longer than empirical
research, which importantly requires thick data, rigorous analysis
of all dimensions, time, and energy. We found that government
ofﬁcials' erratic nature and the inﬂuence of the ruling political party
were more prevalent in foreign inward deals characterized by
higher bid values, listed target companies, cash payments, and
stronger government control in the industry. We also suggested
that a given country's weak institutional and regulatory environ-
ment beneﬁts the acquirer, the target, or both; at the same time,
K.S. Reddy et al. / Paciﬁc Science Review B: Humanities and Social Sciences 1 (2015) 22e44 41this economic behaviour negatively affects the country's ﬁscal
income. Therefore, multinational ﬁrms from developed countries
should be cautious before signing direct investment proposals or
acquiring a ﬁrm in a developing country characterized by higher
levels of corruption and government and political intervention,
and a poor judicial system. Conversely, developing countries
must work seriously on policies related to foreign direct in-
vestments, technology transfers, and cross-border taxes and
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